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Abstract
The traditional theory of second-degree price discrimination tackles individual self-
selection but does not address the possibility that buyers could form a coalition to do
arbitrage, that is, to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate the goods. In this pa-
per, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takes into account both individual and
coalition incentive compatibility when buyers can form a coalition under asymmetric infor-
mation. We show that the monopolist can achieve the same pro￿t regardless of whether
or not buyers can form a coalition. Although, in the optimal sale mechanism, marginal
rates of substitution are not equalized across buyers of diﬀerent types (hence there exists
potential room for arbitrage), they fail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the
transaction costs in coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.
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The theory of monopolistic screening1 (second-degree price discrimination) studies a monop-
olist￿s optimal pricing scheme when she has incomplete information about buyers￿ individual
preferences.2 According to the theory, the monopolist can maximize her pro￿tb yu s i n gam e n u
of packages which induces each type of buyer to select the package designed for the type. While
the theory tackles the self-selection issue at the individual level, it assumes away the possi-
bility that price discrimination might induce buyers to form coalitions to do arbitrage, that
is, to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate the goods they bought among themselves.
Since this might reduce the seller￿s pro￿t, in this paper we study the optimal sale mechanism
which takes into account not only individual incentive compatibility but also coalition incen-
tive compatibility (i.e., buyers￿ incentive to collectively engage in arbitrage). In particular,
in addressing this fundamental and fascinating problem, we focus on the role of asymmetric
information among buyers about each other￿s preferences.
In reality, there exists much evidence of (legal or illegal) coalitions among buyers. On the
one hand, bidders￿ collusive behavior in auctions is well documented and auction literature
has been devoting an increasing attention to the topic.3 On the other hand, buyers often form
cooperatives to jointly purchase goods.4 One central question regarding buyer coalitions is
how asymmetric information among the buyers aﬀects coalition formation. Our major goal is
to identify the transaction costs in coalition formation generated by asymmetric information
and to ￿nd the sale mechanism which best exploits these transaction costs.
Consider for example the situation in which an upstream monopolist sells her goods to
two downstream ￿rms operating in separate markets. Given a menu of quantity-transfer pairs
oﬀered by the monopolist, the two downstream ￿rms can employ two instruments to increase
their joint payoﬀs . F i r s t ,t h e yc a nj o i n t l yd e c i d ew h i c hp a i re a c hb u y e rs h o u l dc h o o s e . I n
our paper, this is modeled by manipulation of the reports which the buyers send into the sale
mechanism. Second, they can reallocate among themselves the goods bought from the seller.
We ￿rst show that under the standard optimal mechanism which neglects coalition incentive
compatibility, buyers can increase their payoﬀs by engaging in arbitrage and this reduces the
1See, for instance, Maskin and Riley (1984) and Mussa and Rosen (1978) for an introduction and Rochet
and Stole (2002) for a recent contribution dealing with random participation.
2We use ￿she￿ to represent the monopolist and ￿he￿ to represent a buyer or the third-party.
3For examples, see Caillaud and Jehiel (1998), Graham and Marshall (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1992)
and Brusco and Lopomo (2002).
4There exist various forms of supply cooperatives to purchase some products together. For instance, He￿e-
bower (1980) describes three types of supply cooperatives: farmers￿s cooperatives, consumer cooperatives and
those run by urban businesses.
1seller￿s pro￿t. However, as the main result, we ￿nd an optimal mechanism which allows the
monopolist to realize the same pro￿t regardless of whether or not buyers can form a coalition
to do arbitrage.
Consider for simplicity a two-buyer setting and suppose that the seller can produce any
amount of a homogeneous product at a constant marginal cost and a buyer has either high
valuation (H-type) or low valuation (L-type) for the product. Assume that types are indepen-
dently and identically distributed and a buyer￿s type is his private information. It is well-known
that in the optimal mechanism(s) without buyer coalition, the quantity allocated to H-type
is equal to the ￿rst-best level while the quantity allocated to L-type is distorted downward
compared to the ￿rst-best level since the payment the seller receives from H-type decreases in
the quantity sold to L-type. This implies that L-type has a higher marginal surplus for the
product than H-type and, if there are no transaction costs in coalition formation, buyers can
increase their payoﬀs by reallocating some quantity from H-type to L-type (with a suitable
money transfer from the latter to the former) in the state of nature in which one buyer has
H- t y p ea n dt h eo t h e rh a sL-type. This may alter ex ante buyers￿ incentives to report truthfully
and reduce the seller￿s expected pro￿t.
Drawing on Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000), we model coalition formation under asym-
metric information by a side-contract oﬀered to the buyers by a third-party who maximizes the
sum of buyers￿ payoﬀs. The side-contract speci￿es both the manipulation of the reports made
into the sale mechanism and the reallocation of the goods obtained from the seller. The side-
contract must satisfy budget balance, participation and incentive constraints. The incentive
constraints need to hold since the third-party does not know the buyers￿ types; the acceptance
constraints are de￿ned with respect to the utilities the buyers obtain when playing the sale
mechanism non-cooperatively.
We ￿rst consider simple mechanisms in which both the quantity that a buyer receives and
his payment do not depend on the other buyer￿s report. We show that if the seller uses the
simple mechanism which is optimal without buyer coalition, buyers can realize strict gains
at the seller￿s loss by suitably arbitraging. For instance, when the both buyers have H-type
(HH-coalition) they have an incentive to report HL instead of truthtelling and to reallocate
quantities and transfers. To see this, note that under the optimal simple mechanism, H-type
is indiﬀerent between the quantity-transfer pair designed for H-type and the pair for L-type.
This implies that if reallocation is impossible, HH-coalition is indiﬀerent between reporting HL
and truth-telling. However, if reallocation is feasible, under standard convexity assumptions
on buyers￿ preferences, each buyer￿s payoﬀ conditional on reporting HL strictly increases since
they can share equally the total quantity and transfers. In contrast, conditional on reporting
2HH, reallocation does not aﬀect the payoﬀs since both buyers receive the same quantity from
the seller. Therefore, HH-coalition prefers to report HL rather than HH.
After studying simple mechanisms, we consider the mechanisms in which the seller makes
the payment of a buyer depend on the report of the other buyer. In particular, we focus on those
transfers which keep the buyers￿ expected payments equal to the ones in the simple optimal
mechanism, while the quantity pro￿le is unchanged. It turns out that there exists a transfer
scheme which allows the seller to deter manipulation of reports and reallocation of goods at no
cost, thus letting her realize the same pro￿t as when there is no buyer coalition. In particular,
even if the marginal rates of substitution are not equalized across buyers with diﬀerent types,
the third party is not able to implement any eﬃcient reallocation between H-type and L-type
in HL-coalition because of the tension between incentive and participation constraints in the
side-contract. The intuition for this result is as follows. Since the rent that H-type obtains by
pretending to be L-type in the side mechanism increases in the quantity received by L-type, if
the third-party reallocates some quantity from H-type to L-type then he is forced to concede
H-type a higher rent in order to elicit a truthful report: the alternative of reducing L-type￿s
payoﬀ is impossible since it would induce L-type to reject the side-contract. This increase in
the rent is de￿ned as the transaction costs generated by asymmetric information. We quantify
the transaction costs and show that they are larger than the gains from reallocating quantity
from H-type to L-type; therefore the reallocation cannot be realized. We also show that
this optimal outcome can be implemented by a menu of two-part tariﬀs. Finally, our main
result that buyer coalition does not hurt the seller extends to more general settings: when the
marginal cost is increasing, or there are n buyers, or there are three possible buyer types.
The literature about consumer coalitions mostly addresses issues diﬀerent from the one we
consider in this paper.5 Alger (1999) is one exception: She studies the optimal menu of price-
quantity pairs when (a continuum of) consumers are able to purchase multiple times or/and
jointly in a two-type setting. She ￿nds that with multiple purchases only, the monopolist oﬀers
strict quantity discounts while, with joint purchases only, discounts are infeasible. Her results
are based on two following assumptions. First, consumer coalitions are formed under complete
information among the consumers about each other￿s type and only consumers with the same
type can form coalitions. Second, the set of mechanisms available to the seller is restricted by
assuming that the quantity allocated to a consumer and his payment do not depend on the
other consumers￿ choices. In contrast, in our model a coalition is formed under asymmetric
5For instance, Innes and Sexton (1993, 1994) analyze the case in which the monopolist is facing identical
consumers who may form coalitions. They show that even though consumers￿ characteristics are homogeneous,
the monopolist may price discriminate in order to deter the formation of coalitions, whereas price discrimination
is unpro￿table in the absence of the coalitions.
3information among buyers and the seller can use complete contracts such that the quantity
sold to a buyer and his payment can depend on the others￿ choices.
Using a third-party to model collusion under asymmetric information was ￿rst introduced
in auction literature ￿ see the ￿rst three papers mentioned in footnote 3. While that literature
studies the optimal auction in a restricted set of mechanisms, usually ￿nding the optimal
reserve price for a ￿rst or second price auction, Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000) use a more
general approach in that they characterize the set of collusion-proof mechanisms and optimize
in this set. In their settings reallocation is infeasible6 and they show that if the agents￿ types
are independently distributed, then a dominant-strategy mechanism implements the second-
best outcome and eliminates any gain from joint manipulation of reports. Furthermore, this
mechanism does not exploit the transaction costs created by asymmetric information. In
our setting, the dominant-strategy mechanism is not collusion-proof since the coalition owns
the additional instrument of quantity reallocation, but the seller can still achieve the second-
best pro￿t by fully exploiting the transaction costs in coalition formation. We also note that
Laﬀont and Martimort limit the analysis to the two-agent-two-type setting and do not consider
implementation through non-direct mechanisms.
Our paper is to some extent related to the papers studying auctions with resale. For
instance, Ausubel and Cramton (1999) analyze the optimal auction when buyers can engage
in resale after receiving goods from the seller and the resale is (assumed to be) always eﬃcient.
They prove that the seller maximizes his pro￿t by allocating goods eﬃciently. In contrast, in
our setting, buyers sign a binding side-contract before each buyer chooses how much to buy
and they fail to achieve eﬃcient reallocation because of the transaction costs.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model and in
Section 3 we review as a benchmark the optimal sale mechanisms without buyer coalition. In
Section 4 we prove that the simple optimal mechanism in which each buyer￿s allocation depends
only on his own report leaves room for arbitrage such that buyer coalition reduces the seller￿s
pro￿t. In order to de￿ne the seller￿s optimization problem under collusion, still in Section 4
we introduce the (weakly) collusion-proofness principle and characterize the constraints that a
collusion-proof mechanism must satisfy. In Section 5, we de￿ne and solve the seller￿s problem
6In the ￿rst paper, they consider two regulated ￿rms producing complementary inputs. The ￿rms have
independently distributed types and collusion has bite since an exogenous restriction on the set of the principal￿s
mechanisms is imposed. In the second paper, they consider collusion between consumers of a public good with
correlated types. Consumers have incentives to collude since the principal will fully extract their rents if they
behave non-cooperatively.
7Zheng (2002) allows resale in a one-good auction with asymmetrically distributed buyers￿ values and proves
that an equilibrium exists which induces the same payoﬀs as if resale can be costlessly banned.
4and prove our main result that these constraints can be satis￿ed without reducing the seller￿s
pro￿t. In Section 6, we extend the main result to more general settings. In Sections 4-6, we
make some speci￿c assumptions about buyers￿ oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path beliefs and behavior. In
Section 7, we show that our main result is robust to relaxing these assumptions. Concluding
remarks are given in Section 8. All of the proofs are left to Appendix except the proof of
Proposition 5.
2 The model
2.1 Preferences, information and mechanisms
A seller (for instance, an upstream monopolist) can produce any amount q ≥ 0 of homogeneous
goods at cost C(q) and sells the goods to n ≥ 2 buyers (for instance, downstream ￿rms
operating in separate markets). Throughout the paper, we will interpret q as quantity except
in Section 4, where we consider also the case in which q represents quality. Buyer i (i =1 ,...,n)
obtains payoﬀ U(qi,θi) − ti from consuming quantity qi ≥ 0 of the goods and paying ti ∈ R
units of money to the seller. He privately observes his own type θi ∈ Θ ≡ {θL,θH}, where
∆θ ≡ θH − θL > 0.T h et y p e sθi and θj are identically and independently distributed for any




∈ (0,1) for i =1 ,...,n; the distribution of (θ1,...,θn) is common
knowledge. We suppose that C(•) and U(•) are such that C(0) = 0, C0(q) > 0 and C00(q) ≥ 0
for any q ≥ 0; U(0,θ)=0 , U1(q,θ) > 0 > U11(q,θ), U2(q,θ) > 0 and U12(q,θ) > 0 for any (q,θ),
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and U12(q,θ) > 0 is the standard Spence-Mirrlees




pL >C 0(ﬂ q), where
ﬂ q is the ￿rst best quantity for an H-type when he is the only buyer (ﬂ q is de￿ned as the unique
solution to U1(q,θH)=C0(q)). This condition guarantees that each type of buyer receives a
positive quantity in the optimum without buyer coalition.8 The reservation utility of each type
of buyer i is given by U(0,θi) − 0=0 ,h i sp a y o ﬀ if he does not transact with the monopolist.
In what follows, for expositional simplicity, we focus on the case with n =2buyers, constant
marginal cost c(> 0) and U(q,θ)=θu(q). However, our main result holds for any n>2,a n y
convex cost function and any U(q,θ) with the properties described above and it also holds in
the three-type setting with Θ ≡ {θL,θM,θH}. See Section 6 for all the extensions.
The seller designs a sale mechanism to maximize her expected pro￿t. A generic sale mech-
anism is denoted by M and, according to the revelation principle, we can restrict our attention
8Our results below holds even when the seller ￿nds it optimal to refuse to serve L-type.
















∈ {θL,θH} is buyer i￿s report, qi(•) is the quantity he receives and ti(•) is his payment
to the seller. Since buyers are ex ante identical, without loss of generality we focus on symmetric





) and not on his identity. Then, we can introduce the following notation to simplify the
exposition: For quantities,
qHH = q1(θH,θH)=q2(θH,θH),q HL = q1(θH,θL)=q2(θL,θH),
qLH = q1(θL,θH)=q2(θH,θL),q LL = q1(θL,θL)=q2(θL,θL).
(tHH,t HL,t LH,t LL) ∈ R4 are similarly de￿ned. Let q ≡ (qHH,q HL,q LH,q LL) denote the vector
of quantities and t ≡ (tHH,t HL,t LH,t LL) denote the vector of transfers.
The sale mechanisms we consider involve (second-degree) price discrimination. Although
price discrimination can be illegal if it threatens to injure competition9, in our context there
is no such concern since the buyers operate in separate markets.
2.2 Buyer coalition
Drawing on Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 2000), we model buyers￿ coalition formation by a
side-contract, denoted by S,o ﬀered by a benevolent third-party. The third party designs S
in order to maximize the sum of buyers￿ expected payoﬀs subject to incentive compatibility
(since he does not observe the types) and participation constraints written with respect to the
utility a buyer obtains when M is played non-cooperatively.
We assume that the seller is the ￿rst mover and can commit not to serve a buyer if the
other buyer refuses M. This limits the strategies available to the buyer coalition: in particular,
the third-party cannot employ the strategy of making only one buyer buy from the seller and
share the goods bought with the other buyer.10 Precisely, the game of seller￿s mechanism oﬀer
cum buyer coalition formation has the following timing.
Stage 1. Nature draws buyers￿ types (θ1,θ2);b u y e ri privately observes θi, i =1 ,2.
9This is the purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act.
10Alternatively, we may assume that if buyer 1 (say) does not accept M, then the seller can serve buyer 2
with a single-buyer mechanism. In this case, our results would still hold if the seller can observe whether or
not a buyer uses her goods as in Rey and Tirole (1986). Since then the seller can induce buyer 2 not to resell
to buyer 1 (part of) the goods he bought from the seller by specifying ex ante a high penalty for buyer 2, both
buyers will buy from the seller in equilibrium.
6Stage 2. The seller proposes a sale mechanism M.
Stage 3. Each buyer simultaneously accepts or rejects M. If at least one buyer refuses M,
then each buyer realizes the reservation utility and the following stages do not occur.
Stage 4. If both buyers accept to play M, then the third party proposes them a direct
side-contract S in order to jointly manipulate their reports into M and to reallocate between
themselves the goods bought from the seller.11
Stage 5. Each buyer simultaneously accepts or rejects S.
Stage 6. If at least one buyer refuses S,t h e nM is played non-cooperatively. In this case,
reports are directly made in M and stages 7 and 9 below do not occur. If instead S has been
accepted by both buyers, then reports are made into S.
Stage 7. As a function of the reports in S, the third party enforces the manipulation of
reports into M.
Stage 8. Quantities and transfers speci￿ed in M are enforced.
Stage 9. Quantity reallocation and side-transfers speci￿ed in S (if any) take place in the
buyer coalition.
Formally, a side-contract S takes the following form:












); i =1 ,2},
where e θ
i
∈ {θL,θH} is buyer i￿s report to the third-party. φ(•) is the report manipulation




) made by the buyers to the third-party into a
pair of reports to the seller. We assume that φ(•) can specify stochastic manipulations, as this
convexi￿es the third-party￿s feasible set. More precisely, let e φ ∈ Θ2 denote an outcome of φ(•).


















)=e φ with some abuse of notation.
After the buyers bought goods from the seller, the third-party can reallocate them within




,e φ) represent the quantity of goods that buyer i receives from the




) denotes the monetary transfer
from buyer i to the third-party; yi does not need to depend on e φ because of quasi linearity of
ab u y e r ￿ sp a y o ﬀ in money. Since we assume that the third party is not a source of goods or
money, a side-contract should satisfy the ex post budget balance constraints for the reallocation
11Actually, the Revelation Principle applies to the third-party￿s design of S but not to the seller￿s design
of M. Thus, the seller may wish to propose non-direct sale mechanisms. Nevertheless, as Proposition 3 in
Laﬀont and Martimort (2000) establishes, any perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome arising from a non-direct
sale mechanism can be obtained as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome induced by a direct sale mechanism.






yi(θ1,θ2)=0 , for any (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2 and any e φ ∈ Θ2.
After a side-contract S is proposed, a two-stage game is played by buyers: in its ￿rst stage
(stage 5) each buyer accepts or rejects S; in the second stage (stage 6) the buyers report types
either into M or into S depending on their decisions at the ￿rst stage. We are interested in
(collusive continuation) equilibria in which both buyers accept S; thus, no learning about types




Assumption WCP: Given an incentive compatible mechanism M,i fb u y e ri
vetoes S (which is an oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path event), then buyer j 6= i still
has prior beliefs about θi and the truthful equilibrium is played in M.
By de￿nition, truthtelling is an equilibrium in M under prior beliefs if and only if M is
incentive compatible. Let UM(θj) (j = L,H) denote the expected payoﬀ of j-type in the
truthful equilibrium in M. Then, UM(θj) is the reservation utility for j-type when deciding
whether to accept S or not. In Section 7, we relax this assumption WCP.
3 The optimal mechanisms without buyer coalition
In this section, we characterize the pro￿t maximizing mechanisms when there is no buyer
coalition. The seller￿s expected pro￿t with mechanism M = {q,t} is
Π ≡ 2p2
L(tLL − cqLL)+2 pL(1 − pL)(tHL + tLH − cqHL − cqLH)+2 ( 1− pL)2(tHH − cqHH)
M should satisfy the following Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints: for H-type,
(BICH) pL[θHu(qHL) − tHL]+( 1− pL)[θHu(qHH) − tHH]
≥ pL[θHu(qLL) − tLL]+( 1− pL)[θHu(qLH) − tLH];
(1)
for L-type,
(BICL) pL[θLu(qLL) − tLL]+( 1− pL)[θLu(qLH) − tLH]
≥ pL[θLu(qHL) − tHL]+( 1− pL)[θLu(qHH) − tHH].
(2)
12Notice, however, that there also exists an equilibrium in which both buyers refuse any side mechanism: If
buyer i is vetoing any side mechanism, then rejecting is a best reply for buyer j.
13WCP means weakly collusion-proof. The assumption makes us add the quali￿er ￿weakly￿ in our de￿nition
of collusion-proof mechanisms: see De￿nition 2.
8M should also satisfy the following individual rationality constraints: for H-type and L-type,
respectively
(BIRH) pL[θHu(qHL) − tHL]+( 1− pL)[θHu(qHH) − tHH] ≥ 0; (3)
(BIRL) pL[θLu(qLL) − tLL]+( 1− pL)[θLu(qLH) − tLH] ≥ 0. (4)
The seller designs M to maximize Π subject to (1) to (4). We characterize the optimal mech-
anisms in the next proposition:
Proposition 1 The optimal mechanisms in the absence of buyer coalition are characterized
as follows.

















(b) Transfers are such that the constraints (BICH) and (BIRL) are binding.
In Proposition 1, q∗
H (q∗
L) is the optimal quantity allocated to H-type (L-type), when the
seller faces a single buyer. Thus, Proposition 1 states that, in the optimal mechanisms for the
two-buyer case, the quantity obtained by a buyer is equal to the quantity he would receive in
the one-buyer setting, independently of the report of the other buyer. In the one-buyer case,
it is well known that the payment the seller obtains from H-type is decreasing in the quantity
received by L- t y p eb e c a u s eo f(BICH). This induces the seller to evaluate L-type￿s surplus
with the so-called virtual valuation θv
L ≡ θL −
1−pL
pL ∆θ < θL instead of θL, and therefore to
distort the quantity allocated to L-type below the ￿rst-best level since she equalizes L-type￿s
marginal virtual surplus to marginal cost.






L and (BICH), (BIRL) bind imply
that the expected payments of L-type and H-type, ﬂ tL ≡ pLtLL +( 1− pL)tLH and ﬂ tH ≡
pLtHL+(1−pL)tHH respectively, are equal to the payments of the two types in the one-buyer
setting: ﬂ tL = t∗
L ≡ θLu(q∗
L) and ﬂ tH = t∗
H ≡ θHu(q∗
H) − (∆θ)u(q∗
L). The seller has two degrees
of freedom in the choice of transfers to satisfy ﬂ tL = t∗
L and ﬂ tH = t∗
H. For instance, she can
set tLL = tLH = t∗
L and tHL = tHH = t∗
H, so that each buyer￿s payment does not depend on










H.I nMd, truthtelling is a dominant strategy since each buyer￿s payoﬀ depends
only on his own report. Basically, with Md the seller maximizes her pro￿t by dealing with
each buyer separately.
A simple intuition sheds light on the close relation between the optimal mechanism in
one-buyer case and the ones in two-buyer case.14 If there exists a mechanism {q0,t0} which is
14We thank Raymond Deneckere for pointing this out to us.
9strictly better than the mechanisms characterized by Proposition 1, then we can ￿nd a menu





the single-buyer model. However, this is impossible by de￿nition.
Last, we make an obvious (but important) observation about the optimal mechanisms in
the absence of buyer coalition.
Observation: In any optimal sale mechanism without buyer coalition, HL-coalition can






L)=c implies that L-type￿s marginal utility for goods
is strictly larger than H-type￿s, HL-coalition has an incentive to reallocate some quantity from
H-type to L-type if there exists no transaction costs in coalition formation. We emphasize that
this incentive exists because the seller reduces the quantity consumed by L-type below the
socially eﬃcient level in order to extract more rent from H-type. In contrast, if she observed
(θ1,θ2), there would be no room for arbitrage since the ￿rst-best quantity schedule (qFB
H ,qFB
L )
is such that θHu0(qFB
H )=θLu0(qFB
L )=c.
4 Coalition under asymmetric information
In this section we introduce formally the third party￿s design problem of S a n dt h e ns h o w
that Md characterized above leaves room for arbitrage, in the sense that buyers can increase
their payoﬀs by manipulating reports and reallocating goods, at the expenses of the seller.
Therefore, this section provides a motivation to look for a mechanism which performs better
than Md in the presence of buyer coalition, the issue we deal with in the next section. In
particular, in this section we also show that the seller can restrict his attention to a particular
set of (collusion-proof) mechanisms which we characterize..
Let p(θ1,θ2) (respectively, p(θi) with i =1 ,2) denote the probability of having (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2




,e φ) denotes the




), the third party requires the buyers to report
e φ ∈ Θ2 to the seller. When e φ is reported to the seller, buyer i receives quantity qi(e φ) from the
seller and pays ti(e φ) to her.
De￿nition 1 A side-contract S∗ = {φ∗(•),x i∗(•),yi∗(•)} is coalition-interim-eﬃcient with re-
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LH) with probability 1 − pL and pays pLt
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i







for any (θi,e θ
i
) ∈ Θ2 and i,j =1 ,2 with i 6= j;
(BIRS) Ui(θi) ≥ UM(θi), for any θi ∈ Θ and i =1 ,2;
(BB : x) x1(θ1,θ2,e φ)+x2(θ1,θ2,e φ)=0 , for any (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2 and any e φ ∈ Θ2;
(BB : y) y1(θ1,θ2)+y2(θ1,θ2)=0 , for any (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2.
In words, a side-contract is coalition-interim-eﬃcient with respect to M if it maximizes
the sum of the buyers￿ expected utilities subject to incentive, acceptance and budget balance
constraints. Let S0 ≡ {φ(•)=Id(•),x 1(•)=x2(•)=0 ,y 1(•)=y2(•)=0 } denote the contract
which implements no manipulation of reports, no reallocation of quantity and no side-transfer;
S0 is called the null-side contract and M is not aﬀected by buyer coalition if the third-party
proposes S0. The next de￿nition refers to this class of mechanisms.
De￿nition 2 A ni n c e n t i v ec o m p a t i b l em e c h a n i s mM is weakly16 collusion-proof if S0 is coalition-
interim-eﬃcient with respect to M.
In the rest of this section, we consider two interpretations of q, quality or quantity,17 and
examine whether or not Md is weakly collusion-proof in each case. The next proposition states
our result:
16The quali￿er ￿weakly￿ comes from our assumption WCP in section 2.2.
17For instance, in Mussa and Rosen (1978), q represents quality. Alger (1999) considers both interpretations
although she focus on quantity interpretation.
11Proposition 2 Suppose the seller oﬀers Md.T h e n
(a) when q represents quality, Md is weakly collusion-proof;
(b) when q represents quantity, there exists a side-contract Sd which increases the payoﬀ of
each type of buyer (and reduces the seller￿s pro￿t) compared to when Md is played truthfully;
in Sd, HH-coalition reports HL to the seller, HL-coalition reports LL and then quantities are
reallocated within the coalitions.
Consider ￿rst the case in which q represents quality and hence reallocation of q is impossible
o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c hq represents quantity but buyers cannot reallocate it (for instance, electric-
ity, gas, water). In these cases, the only instrument of the coalition is manipulation of reports.
Then, Proposition 2(a) establishes that Md is weakly collusion-proof. This result easily follows
from the property that in Md ab u y e r ￿ sp a y o ﬀ is independent of the other buyer￿s report and
no agent has an individual incentive to report untruthfully since (BICH) and (BICL) are
satis￿ed. Therefore, the sum of the buyers￿ payoﬀs is maximized by truthtelling in every state
of nature and the null side-contract satis￿es (BICS), (BIRS) and budget balance constraints;
thus, S0 is coalition-interim-eﬃcient. Notice that collusion has no bite even though it oc-
curs under symmetric information among buyers. We note that Laﬀont and Martimort (1997,
2000) obtain similar ￿ndings (Proposition 11 and Proposition 6, respectively) when they show
that there exists a dominant-strategy optimal mechanism which eliminates any gain from joint
manipulation of reports if the agents￿ types are independently distributed.
We now turn to the case in which q represents quantity and buyers can manipulate their
reports and reallocate quantity. In what follows, for simplicity of discussion, we suppose that
buyers have symmetric information at the time of collusion, which is equivalent to saying that
the third party does not need to satisfy (BICS) or that there are no transaction costs in
coalition formation. This simpli￿cation is innocuous since the underlying logic holds true even
when buyers form the coalition under asymmetric information. One simple way to see why
the possibility of reallocation overturns the result of Proposition 2(a) is to notice that actually
￿ when reallocation is infeasible ￿ coalition HH (HL)i si n d i ﬀerent between truthtelling and
reporting HL (LL)u n d e rMd. Since reallocation makes the coalition more powerful, it is quite
intuitive that now incentives to manipulate reports exist.
To be more clear, we here graphically illustrate the result of Proposition 2(b). In Figure





in mechanism Md.I fHH-coalition reports truthfully, each buyer will achieve B.I fi tr e p o r t s









2 . One can easily see from Figure 1 that each H-type strictly
prefers C to B since C lies on a better indiﬀerence curve than B.F o r m a l l y ,C is preferred to
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Figure 1: Gains from reallocation under the mechanism Md
A or B since C is a convex combination of A and B, H-type is indiﬀerent between A and B
and his preferences are strictly quasi-convex.
For HL-coalition, if it reports LL and does not reallocate quantity, each buyer achieves A
and obtains the same payoﬀ as with truthtelling. However, since H-type￿s marginal surplus
f o rg o o d si sh i g h e rt h a nL-type￿s one when both receive the same quantity, each buyer can
achieve higher payoﬀs by reallocating some goods from L-type to H-type (with an appropriate
money transfer from H-type to L-type): for instance, they can achieve D for L-type and E
for H-type.
Since, according to Proposition 2(b), the seller earns a lower pro￿t than under no coalition
formation when she oﬀers Md, it is natural to inquire whether there exist better mechanisms
than Md. The following proposition simpli￿es our analysis, since it shows that in order to ￿nd
the best mechanism for the seller we can restrict our attention to the set of weakly collusion-
proof mechanisms.
Proposition 3 (weakly collusion-proofness principle) There is no loss of generality in
restricting the seller to oﬀer weakly collusion-proof mechanisms in order to characterize the
outcome of any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game of seller￿s mechanism oﬀer cum
coalition formation such that a collusive equilibrium occurs on the equilibrium path.
13The idea behind Proposition 3 is the following: since the third-party has no informational
or instrumental advantage over the seller and is subject to the incentive, acceptance and
budget balance constraints, any outcome that can be implemented by allowing coalitions to
manipulate reports and/or to reallocate goods can be mimicked by the seller in a collusion-proof
way without loss.
The next proposition characterizes the set of weakly collusion-proof mechanisms.18 Before




which † ∈ [0,1) and x>0:
θ†





H(x) ≡ arg max
z∈[0,x]
θHu(z)+θ†
Lu(x − z) and q†
L(x) ≡ x − q†
H(x) (5)
We note that q†
H(x) is uniquely de￿ned since θHu(z)+θ†
Lu(x−z) is a strictly concave function
of z.I np a r t i c u l a r ,(q†
H(x),q†
L(x)) is the eﬃcient allocation of a total quantity x>0 between
ab u y e rw i t hv a l u a t i o nθH and a buyer with valuation θ†
L.
Proposition 4 An incentive compatible sale mechanism M = {q,t} is weakly collusion-proof
if and only if there exists † ∈ [0,1) such that
(a) the following coalition incentive constraints are satis￿ed: for HH coalition,
(CICHH,HL)2 θHu(qHH) − 2tHH ≥ 2θHu(
qHL + qLH
2
) − tHL − tLH, (6)
(CICHH,LL)2 θHu(qHH) − 2tHH ≥ 2θHu(qLL) − 2tLL; (7)
for HL coalition,
(CICHL,HH) θHu(qHL)+θ†













Lu(qLL) − 2tLL ≥ 2θ†
Lu(qHH) − 2tHH, (10)
(CICLL,HL)2 θ†




) − tHL − tLH; (11)
18We here focus on weakly collusion-proof mechanisms where L-type￿s Bayesian individual incentive constraint
is not binding. We prove in Section 5 that the seller is not going to oﬀer a mechanism M such that L-type￿s
incentive constraint binds in the side-contract which is optimal with respect to M.
14(b) the following no arbitrage constraint (which relies on (5)) is satis￿ed
qHL = q†
H(qHL + qLH), (12)
(c) if †>0,t h e nH-type￿s incentive constraint in the side mechanism is binding.
Notice that each coalition incentive constraint takes into account the reallocation of the
goods: If both agents report the same types to the third party, each buyer receives half of the
total quantity available (see (6)-(7) and (10)-(11)) while if the reports are diﬀerent, the total
quantity is allocated according to (5) (see (8)-(9)). When all the coalition incentive constraints
are satis￿ed, the third-party does not manipulate the buyers￿ reports into M. Then, no room
for reallocation exists if θ1 = θ2 since the seller allocates the same quantity to each buyer. If
θ1 6= θ2, then the third party will not reallocate the goods bought from the seller after making
truthful reports if and only if the no-arbitrage constraint (12) is satis￿ed.
In (8)-(12), † ∈ [0,1) appears. Roughly speaking, † is the Lagrange multiplier of (BICS
H),
H-type￿s incentive constraint in the third-party￿s design problem of S, and it can be positive
when (BICS
H) is binding.19 The seller has some ￿exibility in choosing † since S0 is optimal for
the third party if and only if it satis￿es the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for optimality
in the third party￿s problem for at least one † in [0,1).
In the presence of complete information within the coalition, the side mechanism does not
need to satisfy any individual incentive constraint. Therefore, the coalition incentive and the
no-arbitrage constraints under complete information are obtained from (6)-(12) by taking †
equal to 0 and the third party realizes whatever gains from cooperative actions if there is any.
When the coalition forms under asymmetric information, it may be costly to satisfy (BICS
H)
because of a well-known tension between (BICS
H) and (BIRS
L); † measures how costly it is.
The coalition incentive constraints under asymmetric information diﬀer from the constraints
under complete information since L-type￿s valuation θL is replaced by the virtual value θ†
L.T h e
latter is smaller than θL for †>0 since, as the quantity allocated to L- t y p e( b yt h et h i r dp a r t y )
increases, it is more diﬃcult to satisfy (BICS
H).T h ev a l u eo fθ†
L aﬀects the coalition incentive
constrains through two channels. First, given a quantity consumed by L-type, the third-party
evaluates his surplus with θ†
L instead of θL. Second, this in turn aﬀects the third-party￿s
decision to reallocate the goods given a total quantity available to a coalition.
One might argue that the seller could ask the buyers for the information that they may
have learned during the course of coalition formation. However, there is no loss in restricting
the seller to use mechanisms such as those de￿n e di ns u b s e c t i o n2 . 1s i n c ew es h o wt h a ts h e
can nevertheless deter buyer coalition at no cost.
19Precisely, † =
δ
a+δ where δ is the Lagrange multiplier of (BIC
S
H) and a>0.
155 The optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanisms
In this section, we analyze the optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism. Observe that when
the third party proposes S0, (i) the Bayesian incentive constraints (BICS) in the side mech-
anism reduce to (BICH) and (BICL) introduced in section 3; (ii) the acceptance constraints
(BIRS) in the side mechanism are automatically satis￿ed with equality. Hence, the seller￿s
maximization program under collusion - denoted by (P) -i sd e ￿ned as follows:
max
{q,t,†}
Π subject to (1)-(4) and (6)-(12).
Since (P) has more constraints than the seller￿s program without collusion, the seller cannot
earn more pro￿t in the presence of collusion than in its absence. However, the next proposition
states that the pro￿t level is the same in the two cases. More precisely, it provides a transfer
schedule which, paired with the quantity pro￿le q∗ of Proposition 1, yields the seller the pro￿t
she obtains in the absence of collusion.
Proposition 5 Let t∗∗ be such that (BIRL), (BICH), (CICHH,HL) and (CICHL,LL) bind
when q = q∗ and ε =1 .20 Then M∗∗ ≡ {q∗,t∗∗} is both an optimal mechanism in the absence
of buyer coalition and weakly collusion-proof.
Proof. We basically prove that the seller can satisfy all the constraints imposed by weak
collusion-proofness without any loss.
We ￿rst notice that q∗ satis￿es the no-arbitrage constraint (12) with ε =1 .I nf a c t ,w h e nε =1
both the seller and the third-party have the same virtual valuation of L-type, θL −
1−pL
pL ∆θ;
hence the third-party has no incentive to modify the quantity allocation q∗ decided by the seller.
Then, we can ￿nd a (unique) transfer pro￿le t∗∗ such that (BIRL), (BICH), (CICHH,HL) and
(CICHL,LL) bind when q = q∗ and ε =1(see the appendix). We remark that this is possible
because satisfying (BIRL) and (BICH) with equality absorbs only two degrees of freedom
from the transfer schedule t.B yP r o p o s i t i o n1 ,M∗∗ ≡ {q∗,t∗∗} is optimal in the absence of
coalition since (BIRL) and (BICH) bind.
In order to prove that M∗∗ satis￿es all the coalition incentive constraints, let V †
m(x) denote
the total virtual surplus21 that a coalition having m number of buyers with H-type derives
from consuming a total quantity x>0; m ∈ {0,1,2} is viewed as the ￿type￿ of the coalition.




1 (x) ≡ maxz∈[0,x] θHu(z)+θ
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Lu(x − z). In V
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2 (x) is independent of † since there is no L-type in HH-coalition.
16We regard each coalition as a consolidated agent and V †
m as the surplus function of type m.













∂x for any x>0 and any † ≥ 0 (see Lemma 1 in the appendix).
These two properties, together with the fact that in M∗∗ the local downward coalition incentive
constraints bind, allow us to use a standard result from the theory of monopolistic screening [see
Section 3 in Maskin and Riley (1984)] to conclude that all the coalition incentive constraints
are satis￿ed.
Proposition 5 says that the seller can implement the quantity pro￿le q∗ as when there
is no buyer coalition and can deter collusion at no cost, thus realizing the same pro￿ta s
without collusion. Hence, under asymmetric information, the ability to form a coalition does
not help the buyers to increase their payoﬀs. In particular, even though the third party aims
at maximizing the buyers￿ payoﬀs and marginal rates of substitution are not equalized across
buyers in HL-coalition, no side mechanism can implement a desirable reallocation when the
seller uses M∗∗. We provide an intuition in two steps for this result.
No reallocation occurs if there is no manipulation of reports To give an intuition
of why the third-party fails to eﬃciently reallocate the goods, suppose that the buyers do not
manipulate their reports. Then, we can show that no reallocation of quantity occurs under
M∗∗. Obviously, no room for reallocation exists within the coalitions HH and LL since the
seller allocates the same quantity to each buyer in these homogenous coalitions. However, in
the case of HL-coalition, potential room for arbitrage exists since L-type￿s marginal utility for
the goods is larger than H-type￿s. To understand why no reallocation occurs in this coalition,
it is important to recall that under asymmetric information, a side mechanism needs to satisfy
both (BICS) and (BIRS).S i n c e(BICS
H) binds in the side mechanism which is optimal with
respect to M∗∗ and the information rent H-type obtains by pretending to be L-type to the
third-party increases in the quantity received by L-type, the third party evaluates L-type￿s
surplus not with θL but with a virtual valuation smaller than θL. Furthermore, since the third
party has the same prior beliefs about the buyers￿ types as the seller and also (BIRS
L) binds,
H-type￿s rent as a function of the quantity received by L-type increases with the same slope
both in the third-party￿s problem and in the seller￿s problem with no coalition. Therefore,
the third party evaluates L-type￿s surplus with the same virtual valuation θv
L as the seller22
and consequently he has no incentive to modify the allocation q∗ at which H-type￿s marginal
s u r p l u si se q u a lt oL-type￿s virtual marginal surplus.
22See the proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix for the formal derivation of L-type￿s virtual value from the
third-party￿s point of view.
17Alternatively, we can explain the no-reallocation result by directly computing the transac-
tion costs created by asymmetric information and showing that they are larger than the gains
from reallocation.23 Consider reallocating a quantity ∆q ∈ (0,q∗
H] from H-type to L-type
within HL-coalition. First, the gains from reallocation are given by G ≡ θL [u(q∗




H − ∆q)], which is positive, at least for a small ∆q, from the inequality θLu0(q∗
L) >
θHu0(q∗
H). Second, the reallocation also increases H-type￿s rent since it increases the quan-
tity consumed by L-type; we de￿ne this increase in rent as the transaction costs TC cre-
ated by asymmetric information. In order to compute TC, suppose that an H-type pre-
tends to be L-type to the third-party while the other buyer reports truthfully. Then, the
expected surplus of the former is equal to (1 − pL)θHu(q∗
L + ∆q)+pLθHu(q∗
L) while his
expected payment is equal to (1 − pL)θLu(q∗
L + ∆q)+pLθLu(q∗
L), determined by the bind-
ing L-type￿s participation constraint in the side-mechanism. Therefore, H-type￿s expected
rent is ∆θ[(1 − pL)u(q∗
L + ∆q)+pLu(q∗
L)],h i g h e rt h a nh i sr e n t∆θu(q∗
L) when ∆q =0 ,a n d
TC = ∆θ(1 − pL)[u(q∗
L + ∆q) − u(q∗
L)]. Last, the third-party can implement the reallocation
only if the expected gain from reallocation 2pL(1 − pL)G are larger than the expected trans-
action costs 2(1 − pL)TC.S i n c e2pL(1 − pL)G<2(1 − pL)TC holds for any ∆q ∈ (0,q ∗
H],w e
conclude that reallocation is infeasible.
No manipulation of reports is pro￿table In order to understand why no manipulation
is implemented given M∗∗,i ti su s e f u lt od e ￿ne V 1
m(x) ( a si nt h ep r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5 )
as the total surplus a coalition with m buyers with H-type derives from a total quantity
x>0 after optimally allocating x within the coalition with ε =1 . As we mentioned above,
the third party evaluates the surplus of L-type with θv
L instead of θL. Therefore, we have
V 1
1 (x) ≡ maxz∈[0,x] θHu(z)+θv
Lu(x − z) and V 1
0 (x) ≡ 2θv
Lu(x
2), while V2(x) ≡ 2θHu(x
2) as
under symmetric information.
As a ￿rst step, we below focus on the two downward manipulations which are mentioned
in Proposition 2(b). When q = q∗, HH-coalition prefers truthful report to reporting HL if
and only if the following inequality holds:
V2(2q∗
H) − 2tHH ≥ V2(q∗
H + q∗
L) − tHL − tLH (13)




L) − tHL − tLH ≥ V 1
1 (2q∗
L) − 2tLL (14)
23Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) and Williams (1999) use an argument similar to ours to prove (non-) existence
of eﬃcient mechanisms in environments which include Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983)￿s one seller-one buyer
setting as a special case.
18We notice that the transfers in Md violate both (13) and (14), but the seller can ￿nd transfers
which satisfy (13) and (14) and make (BICH) and (BIRL) bind. On the one hand, a suitable
decrease in tHH and an increase in tHL,b o t hw i t hr e s p e c tt ot∗
H, allow to satisfy (13) while
keeping (BICH) binding, as it is necessary to achieve the same pro￿t as without collusion. On
the other hand, an increase in tLL and a decrease in tLH, both with respect to t∗
L, allow to satisfy
(14) while keeping (BIRL) still binding. Formally, the seller can use two degrees of freedom in
transfers to satisfy (13) and (14) at no cost while using the remaining two degrees freedom to
leave (BIRL) and (BICH) binding. Indeed, the transfers t∗∗ in Proposition 5 are de￿ned as the
(unique) pro￿le of transfers which satis￿es all (BIRL), (BICH), (CICHH,HL) and (CICHL,LL)








We graphically explain how t∗∗ deters HH-coalition from reporting HL.24 In ￿gure 2,
A and B are de￿ned as in ￿gure 1 and represent the two quantity-transfer pairs under Md.
Under M∗∗, after reporting truthfully, each buyer in HH-coalition obtains the pair B0,w h i c hi s
better than B since t∗∗
HH <t ∗
H holds while, after reporting HLand sharing equally the quantity








2 ).S i n c eb yc o n s t r u c t i o n
H-type is indiﬀerent between B0 and C0,t h eHH-coalition will report truthfully under M∗∗.
We now argue that also the coalition incentive constraints we neglected are satis￿ed by
M∗∗. For this purpose, we note that (i) (13) and (14) (the local downward coalition incentive













LL. Therefore, we can use a standard result from the theory of monopolistic
screening [see Section 3 in Maskin and Riley (1984)] to conclude that (6)-(11) are satis￿ed.
It is interesting to notice that there exist in￿nitely many transfer schemes b t such that n
q∗,b t
o
is optimal under no coalition and weakly collusion-proof (for instance, it is possible to
strictly satisfy (6)-(11) without reducing the pro￿t).26 However, the following inequalities
b tLH <t ∗
L < b tLL and b tHH <t ∗
H < b tHL (15)
must be satis￿ed by any such b t. The inequalities mean that upon reporting a type, each buyer
faces a lottery which determines his payment as a function of the report of the other buyer.
In particular, facing an L-type is bad news because then the payment is higher than when
24We only examine (CICHH,HL) because representing (CICHL,LL) in Figure 2 is much more diﬃcult since,
in HL-coalition, goods are not reallocated evenly as in HH-coalition.
25See the proof of lemma 1 in the appendix for the details.
26In Section 7, we exploit this multiplicity to ￿nd an optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism which is
strategically more robust than M
∗∗.
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Figure 2: Transfers inducing an HH-coalition to report truthfully
facing an H-type. This feature results from the seller￿s desire to deter coalitions￿ downward
manipulation of reports, as we below argue in proving (15).
To show (15), let b tHL = t∗
H+a, b tLL = t∗
L+b, b tHH = t∗
H−
pLa










and β ≡ V 1
1 (q∗
H + q∗




L). Then, (CICHH,HL) and (CICHL,LL) at q = q∗
reduce respectively to
(1 − pL)α ≥− a − pL(a − b) and (1 − pL)β ≥− b +(1− pL)(a − b)
Therefore, the set of (a,b) which satisfy (CICHH,HL) and (CICHL,LL) is given by Z ≡ n
(a,b) ∈ R2 |
(1−pL)α+(1+pL)a









2−pL holds corresponds to the transfers t∗∗ of M∗∗. Figure 3 represents Z graph-




2−pL,a n y(a,b) ∈ Z should be such that a>0 and
b>0. Therefore, for any mechanism which is optimal under no coalition and satis￿es (13)-(14)
(necessary conditions for weakly collusion-proofness), its transfers b t must satisfy (15). This
implies in particular that (i) Md is not weakly collusion-proof since a = b =0in Md (ii) ex
27It is straightforward to verify that α < 0. For the proof of β < 0 see the Appendix, immediately before the
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Figure 3: Transfers in the optimal collusion-proof mechanisms: a necessary condition
post individual rationality is violated for L-type in any mechanism which is optimal under no
coalition and weakly collusion-proof since t∗
L = θLu(q∗
L) < b tLL holds.
Remark 1 (symmetric information in the coalition): Even though we focus on the
role of asymmetric information among buyers, it is interesting to inquire the consequences
of collusion taking place under symmetric information. For instance, suppose that the third
party owns a technology that allows him to elicit credible reports from the buyers as in Baron
and Besanko (1999).28 In this case the side mechanism does not need to satisfy (BICS),
implying that the third party evaluates L-type￿s surplus with the real valuation θL rather than
with the virtual value θv
L. The coalition incentive constraints under symmetric information
are similar to those under asymmetric information except that now, in de￿ning V ε
1 (x) and
V ε
0 (x), θL is used instead of θε
L. Still, the seller can deter manipulation of reports at no cost as
under asymmetric information. However, reallocation within HL-coalition takes place unless
θHu0(qHL)=θLu(qLH), a condition which reduces the seller￿s pro￿t with respect to the case
without buyer coalition.
28They assume that the third-party who organizes an informational alliance can verify the private information
of each agent forming the alliance.
21Remark 2 (correlation): Proposition 5 does not hold if θ1 are θ2 are correlated. In-
deed, in a correlated environment the seller earns the ￿r s tb e s tp r o ￿t in the absence of buyer
coalition (see CrØmer and McLean (1985)), but that is not possible under coalition forma-
tion. We examined a speci￿cc a s ei nw h i c ht h ep a y o ﬀ of type θ from consuming quantity
q ∈ [0,θ] is θq − 1
2q2 and Pr
'













θ1 = θL, θ2 = θH
“
.N o w ,at r a d e - o ﬀ about the value of ε arises. On the one hand, as in
t h ec a s eo fi n d e p e n d e n tt y p e s ,al a r g eε helps to discriminate H-type from L-type. On the
other hand, the constraint (CICHL,LL) binds and it is tightened as ε increases. For the case of
small and positive correlation, it turns out that the trade-oﬀ is optimally resolved by setting
ε strictly below 1. We also obtain, as in Laﬀont and Martimort (2000), that the solution is
continuous in the degree of correlation; furthermore, the optimal values of qHL and qLH are
decreasing with respect to the degree of correlation, while qLL is increasing.
Two-part tariﬀs Two-part tariﬀs are sometimes proposed as a simple way to implement
non-linear tariﬀs, or as a ￿real-life￿ mechanism as opposed to abstract direct mechanisms.
In the model with no buyer coalition, it is easy to see that the optimal outcome can be
implemented by a menu of two-part tariﬀs such that each type of buyer chooses the tariﬀ
designed for his type and buys the quantity q∗
H or q∗
L according to his type. We note that the
two-part tariﬀ designed for L-type needs a kink in order to prevent H-type from choosing the
tariﬀ designed for L-type and buying more than q∗
L.29
The next proposition states that a more complicated menu of two-part tariﬀsc a nb e
used to implement the optimal outcome when coalition formation is possible. We continue
to assume that the seller can commit not to serve a buyer if the other buyer does not buy
anything from the seller.30 Let the seller oﬀer tariﬀs TH = {(AHH,p HH),(AHL,p HL)} and
TL = {(ALH,p LH),(ALL,p LL)} where, for instance, AHL and pHL represent the ￿xed fee and
the marginal price that a buyer choosing TH pays if the other buyer chooses TL.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
we consider the tariﬀs {T∗∗
H ,T∗∗





j, for j,k ∈ {H,L},
p∗∗
jk = c for q ≤ q∗
j and p∗∗
jk = θHu0(q∗
L) for q>q ∗
j for j,k ∈ {H,L}.
(16)




H and p = c.S i n c e t h e t a r i ﬀ
for L- t y p en e e d sak i n ka tt h ep o i n tq = q
∗
L, the seller has some discretion in choosing the marginal price. For




L and p = c for q ≤ q
∗






30As we said in footnote 10, our results hold even if this assumption does not hold but the seller can observe
whether or not a buyer uses her goods. This makes it impossible for a buyer to obtain a positive amount of the
goods without paying any ￿xed fee to the seller as in Rey and Tirole (1986).
22Proposition 6 Suppose that the seller oﬀers {T∗∗
H ,T∗∗
L } instead of M∗∗. Then, regardless of
whether or not the buyers can form a coalition,
(a) each buyer accepts the oﬀer,
(b) j- t y p eo fb u y e r ,w i t hj ∈ {H,L}, chooses the tariﬀ T∗∗
j and buys quantity q∗
j.
T h em e n u( 1 6 )i ss u c ht h a t( i)t h e￿xed fee a buyer pays depends on the tariﬀ chosen by
the other buyer (which is necessary since t∗∗ requires this sort of dependence) (ii) the tariﬀ
each buyer faces has a kink.31 The kink is necessary in order to deter downward manipulation
of reports. For instance, suppose there is no kink in T∗∗




holds, a HH-coalition has an incentive to coordinate the buyers￿ purchases such that only one
buyer chooses T∗∗
H ,h eb u y sm o r et h a nq∗
H and shares it with the other buyer who chooses
T∗∗
L .32 This deviation is prevented by the increase in the marginal price at q = q∗
H - the kink -
from c to θHu0(q∗
L).
6E x t e n s i o n s
In the previous sections, for simplicity we considered the two-buyer-two-type setting with
C(q)=cq and U(q,θ)=θu(q). However, Proposition 5 can be extended to an environment
with n buyers and two types, or with twobuyers and three types, or with general cost and
utility functions which satisfy the conditions introduced in subsection 2.1.
6.1 The case of n>2 buyers
When the seller faces n>2 buyers, we assume that the only feasible coalition is the grand
coalition, the one including all the buyers. More precisely, we suppose that if at least one
buyer rejects the side mechanism, then the sale mechanism is played non-cooperatively with
prior beliefs (i.e., we keep assumption WCP). This assumption is justi￿ed when any attempt to
organize a coalition - after the grand coalition was rejected - is suﬃciently time consuming such
that it is impossible for the third party to design a new side mechanism which is tailored for
the buyers who accepted the original side mechanism. Clearly, this assumption is not needed
if n =2but it makes the model quite tractable when n>2.
31Actually, no kink is needed when both buyers choose T
∗∗
H :w ec a nh a v epHH = c for all q ≥ 0. However, in
this case both the ￿xed fee and the marginal price paid by a buyer choosing T
∗∗
H depends on the tariﬀ chosen
by the other buyer, while in (16) the marginal price depends only on his choice.
32Likewise, if there were no kink in T
∗∗
L , the buyer who pretended to be L-type may buy more than q
∗
L and
then share with the other buyer.
23Without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to symmetric sale mechanisms, which
are now introduced. Let qLm (m =0 ,1,...,n − 1) denote the quantity allocated to each




) ∈ Θn includes exactly m
number of H-types. The variables qHm, tHm and tLm are de￿ned similarly. Let qn ≡
(qL0,...,qLn−1,q H1,...,qHn) and tn ≡ (tL0,...,tLn−1,t H1,...,t Hn), so that a sale mechanism
is given by Mn = {qn,tn}. Any optimal mechanism {q∗










Proposition 3, the weakly collusion-proofness principle, applies to this setting. Here we
generalize Proposition 4 by describing the conditions under which an incentive compatible
mechanism Mn is weakly collusion-proof. In order to do that, we need to investigate how
goods are reallocated by the third party in an m-coalition ￿ a coalition with m number of
H-types and n − m number of L-types ￿ when x(> 0) is the total quantity available to the
coalition. Since u00 < 0,i na n ym−coalition the third-party allocates the same quantity to
e a c hb u y e ro ft h es a m et y p e . P r e c i s e l y ,i fq u a n t i t yz is allocated to each H-type, then each
L-type receives x−mz
n−m ;c l e a r l y ,i fm = n (or m =0 ) then each H-type (L-type) receives x
n.T h e
quantity allocated to H-type is q†
Hm(x) de￿ned as
q†
Hm(x) ≡ arg max
z∈[0, x
m]




), m =1 ,...,n − 1
Hence, the no-reallocation condition for an m-coalition (if qLm > 0)i s :
θHu0(qHm)=θ†
Lu0(qLm) (17)
If (17) is satis￿ed by Mn,t h e na nm-coalition which reports truthfully in Mn has no incentive









), m =1 ,...,n − 1
is the gross payoﬀ for an m-coalition when it owns the total quantity x,g i v e nε.F o rn-coalition
and 0-coalition we have Vn(x)=θHu(x
n) and V †
0(x)=θ†
Lu(x
n), respectively. As in the proof of
Proposition 5, we regard each coalition as a consolidated agent and V †
m is the surplus function
of type m. For an m-coalition, manipulating its reports is equivalent to reporting a number
m0(6= m) of buyers with H-type. The next proposition summarizes the coalition incentive and
the no-arbitrage constraints.
Proposition 7 An incentive compatible sale mechanism Mn is weakly collusion-proof if and
only if there exists † ∈ [0,1) such that
24(a) the following coalition incentive constraints are satis￿ed:
V †
m[mqHm +( n − m)qLm] − mtHm − (n − m)tLm
≥ V †
m[m0qHm0 +(n − m0)qLm0] − m0tHm0 − (n − m0)tLm0 for any (m,m0) ∈ {0,1,...,n}
2
(b) the no-arbitrage condition (17) holds for m =1 ,...,n − 1.
(c) if †>0,t h e nH-type￿s incentive constraint in the side mechanism is binding.
The next proposition establishes that the buyer coalition does not create any loss to the
seller, as in the case of n =2 .
Proposition 8 Given the quantity schedule q∗
n, there exists transfers t∗∗




n } is optimal under no buyer coalition and is also weakly collusion-proof.
Remark 3 (transaction costs): We can compare the expected gains from arbitrage with
the transaction costs generated by asymmetric information for the n-buyer case. Suppose for
instance that the third-party reallocates quantity such that when there are m number of H-













(pL)n−m(1 − pL)m{(n − m)θL [u(q∗



















L + ∆q) − u(q∗
L)].






. In particular, given ∆q>0,
TC(2m,m)=kG(2m,m) holds where k (> 1) does not depend on m.
6.2 The case of three types
Mechanism design problems under collusion often turn out to be qualitatively more complicated
when there are more than two types than when there are only two types. For instance, Laﬀont
and Martimort (1997, 2000) limit their analysis to the two-type setting since it is diﬃcult
to determine the binding coalition incentive constraints when there are more than two types.
Here we brie￿y explain how ￿ in our model ￿ Proposition 5 extends to the three-type setting.
25The main diﬃculty is related to the fact that the single-crossing condition for coalitions holds
only partially.
Now the valuation θi of buyer i lies in Θ ≡ {θL,θM,θH},w i t h∆H ≡ θH − θM > 0,
∆M ≡ θM − θL > 0 and θL > 0.T h e t y p e s θ1 and θ2 are identically and independently













In the absence of buyer coalition, the virtual values of M-type and L-type are given by:
θv
M ≡ θM −
pH
pM
(θH − θM) θv




Clearly, θH > max{θv
M,θv
L} but the order between θv
M and θv
L depends on the parameters; if
θv
M ≥ θv
L, then virtual values are said to be monotonic; if θv
M < θv







In any case, we assume that min{θv
Mu0(0),θv
Lu0(0)} >c , so that each type receives a positive
quantity in case of no coalition.
As in the previous sections, we can restrict attention to symmetric direct revelation mech-
anisms, hence a sale mechanism is M = {q,t},w i t hq ≡ {qjk}j,k=L,M,H, t ≡ {tjk}j,k=L,M,H
and qjk (tjk) is the quantity received by a buyer (his payment) if he reports j and the other
buyer reports k.L e tﬂ tj ≡ pLtjL+pMtjM +pHtjH and ﬂ uj ≡ pLu(qjL)+pMu(qjM)+pHu(qjH),
j = L,M,H. Then, the expected pro￿t is written as
Π =2 ( pLﬂ tL + pMﬂ tM + pHﬂ tH) − 2c[p2
LqLL + pLpM(qLM + qML)+pLpH(qHL + qLH)]
−2c[p2
MqMM + pMpH(qMH + qHM)+p2
HqHH]
The Bayesian incentive compatibility and participation constraints are
(BIC) θjﬂ uj − ﬂ tj ≥ θjﬂ uj0 − ﬂ tj0, j,j0 = L,M,H
(BIR) θjﬂ uj − ﬂ tj ≥ 0, j = L,M,H
The seller maximizes Π subject to (BIC) and (BIR). The next proposition characterizes the
optimal mechanisms in the absence of buyer coalition.
Proposition 9 The optimal mechanisms in the absence of buyer coalition are characterized
as follows
(a) The optimal quantity schedule q∗ is such that:
i) q∗
Hj = q∗















L with ﬂ θ
v
MLu0(q∗
L)=c if instead θv
M < θv
L.
(b) Transfers are such that constraints (BICHM), (BICML) and (BIRL) bind.
26As in the two-type case, the weakly collusion-proofness principle holds. In order to char-




L;i i )t h ef u n c t i o n sq†
j(x;jk) and q†
k(x;jk), jk = HM,HL,ML; iii) the functions V †
jk(x),
j,k = L,M,H as follows:
θ†
H ≡ θH, θ†













ku(x − z) and q†







ku(x − z), j,k = L,M,H
where † ≡ (†HM,† ML) ∈ [0,1) ￿ [0,+∞) and x>0.
The next proposition characterizes weakly collusion-proof mechanisms.
Proposition 10 An incentive compatible sale mechanism M is weakly collusion-proof if and
only if there exists † ∈ [0,1) ￿ [0,+∞) such that
(a) the coalition incentive constraints are satis￿ed
V †
jk(qjk + qkj) − tjk − tkj ≥ V †
jk(qj0k0 + qk0j0) − tj0k0 − tk0j0,f o r a n y j,k,j0,k0 = L,M,H.
(18)
(b) the no arbitrage constraints hold
qjk = q†
j(qjk + qkj;jk),f o r jk = HM,HL,ML. (19)
(c) if †HM > 0( resp. †ML > 0),t h e n(BICS
HM)[ resp. (BICS
ML)] binds.
By exploiting Proposition 10 we can prove that the buyer coalition does not create any loss
to the seller.
Proposition 11 There exists a transfer scheme t∗∗ such that M∗∗ ≡ {q∗,t∗∗} is both an
optimal mechanism in the absence of collusion and weakly collusion-proof.
We below provide an intuition of the result: the intuition is similar to the one for the
two-type case although some technical details of the proof are more complicated. Given M∗∗,
the virtual values of M-type and L-type from the third party￿s viewpoint are equal to θv
M and
θv
L, the virtual valuations from the seller￿s viewpoint; hence the third-party will not reallocate
goods conditional on that there is no manipulation of reports. Furthermore, the seller can
use the six degrees of freedom in transfers in the optimal mechanisms under no coalition to
satisfy (18), although the single crossing condition for coalitions holds only partially (it does
not provide an order between coalitions HL and MM) and this makes more diﬃcult to ￿nd
the right transfers than in the two-type setting. We conjecture that our result will hold even
when there are more than three types.
276.3 General cost function C and utility function U
Here we show that Proposition 5 holds in the two-buyer-two-type setting if (i) the cost function
satis￿es C(0) = 0, C0(q) > 0 and C00(q) ≥ 0 for any q ≥ 0; (ii) the utility function satis￿es
U1(q,θ) > 0 > U11(q,θ), U(0,θ)=0 , U2(q,θ) > 0, U12(q,θ) > 0 for any (q,θ).
Proposition 12 In the setting of this subsection
(i) the optimal mechanisms in the absence of buyer coalition are such that (BIRL) and (BICH)






















LL, then the optimal mechanism M∗∗ in which (CICHH,HL) and
(CICHL,LL) bind is weakly collusion-proof; if q∗
HL + q∗
LH < 2q∗
LL, then the optimal mecha-
nism M∗∗∗ in which (CICHH,LL) and (CICLL,HL) bind is weakly collusion-proof
N o t i c et h a t ,i np a r t i c u l a r ,P r o p o s i t i o n5h o l d si na na u c t i o ns e t t i n gi nw h i c has i n g l eo b j e c t
is up for sale: q ∈ [0,1] is the probability to win the object and U(q,θ)=θq.33
7 Robustness to cheap-talk and multiplicity
In this section we eliminate the assumption WCP and examine two issues which arise after the
third-party￿s proposal of S0 in response to M∗∗:t h e￿rst is about whether or not both buyers
will accept S0 and the second is about whether they will play the truthtelling equilibrium after
accepting S0. It turns out that under a mild condition on the function u (see Proposition 13
below), both buyers accept S0 but in M∗∗ truthtelling is iteratively weakly dominated for H-
type although it is strictly dominant for L-type. This motivates us to ￿nd a robust mechanism
MR in the set of optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanisms such that if MR is proposed by
the seller, then both buyers accept S0 and truthtelling is strictly dominant for L-type and
iteratively weakly dominant for H-type. In what follows, we ￿rst explain the two issues in
more detail, present the results for M∗∗ a n dt h e nc h a r a c t e r i z eMR.
Let f M be an optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism oﬀered by the seller. The ￿rst issue
arises because, as we explained in Subsection 2.2, a two-stage game starts after the third party￿s
proposal of S0. First each buyer simultaneously announces whether he accepts or refuses S0
a n dt h e nb u y e r sr e p o r te i t h e ri nS0 if it was unanimously accepted, or in f M otherwise. In any
33In this environment the seller does not need to exploit the information asymmetry between the buyers.
Indeed, under no buyer coalition, there exists no potential room for arbitrage in HL-coalition because the
marginal surplus of each type is constant and a corner solution achieves the ￿rst-best allocation and is optimal
for the seller.
28case, however, in the second stage f M is actually played since S0 is null. Therefore, buyer i￿s
choice (veto or accept) in the ￿rst stage can be viewed as a preplay announcement which may
signal some information about θi. In other words, the ￿rst stage is just a sort of cheap-talk
s t a g ei nw h i c hab u y e rm a ys i g n a lh i st y p e .W ef o c u s s e da b o v eo nt h ec a s ei nw h i c he a c ht y p eo f
buyer accepts S0, hence no learning occurs along the equilibrium path. Assume for a moment
that it is common knowledge that buyers are going to play truthfully if S0 is accepted (we deal
with this issue below). Then, no type wishes to reject S0 under the assumption WCP: in fact,
buyers are indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting S0. However, without the assumption,
many oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path behavior and beliefs are possible. For instance, buyer 1 might
expect that a non-truthful equilibrium of f M (if any exists) will be played (possibly under non-
prior beliefs of 2about θ1)i nc a s eh ev e t o e sS0. In other words, some type of buyer 1 might
have the incentive to veto S0 ￿ which is a sort of out-of-equilibrium ￿message￿ ￿ in order to
manipulate buyer 2￿s beliefs about θ1 and/or behavior such that he can reach a higher payoﬀ
for himself when playing f M at the next stage.
The second issue arises when buyers have to report in S0 a f t e rb o t ho ft h e ma c c e p t e d
S0.R e p o r t i n g i n S0 is equivalent to playing non-cooperatively f M with prior beliefs, since
each buyer i has prior beliefs about θj (j 6= i)a f t e rS0 has been unanimously accepted.
Although truthtelling is an equilibrium in f M, there may exist other equilibria which buyers
may coordinate on.
The next proposition describes our results about the two issues when the seller oﬀers M∗∗.
Proposition 13 If
u00(x)
u0(x) is strictly increasing in x,34 then in M∗∗
(a) reporting L is strictly dominant for each L-type, while each H-type strictly prefers reporting
H (L) if his opponent plays H (L);
(b) there is no belief of buyer i (after a rejection of S0 by buyer j(6= i)) which supports an
equilibrium of M∗∗ in which at least one type of buyer j is better oﬀ than in the truthtelling
equilibrium;
(c) in the only non-truthful equilibrium, each type of buyer reports L. For buyers (and seller),
the non-truthful equilibrium is strictly Pareto-dominated by the truthful one.
Although Proposition 13(b)-(c) deals with the two issues we introduced above for M∗∗,
Proposition 13(a) reveals that truthtelling is iteratively weakly dominated for H-type.
We avoid this problem by designing a mechanism MR in which truthtelling is iteratively
weakly dominant for H- t y p e .F o rt h i sp u r p o s e ,i ti su s e f u lt oe x a m i n et h ep a y o ﬀ bimatrix of
34When u is a Bernoulli utility function over money, this assumption on u is called ￿decreasing absolute
risk-aversion￿.
29the symmetric 2 ￿ 2 game played by two buyers with H-type ￿ let 1H and 2H denote them -
when the seller oﬀers an optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism and each L-type plays L:35
1H\2H LH
L θHu(q∗
L) − tLL θHu(q∗








We see that when his opponent H-type reports L,a n yH-type prefers reporting H rather than
L if θHu(q∗
H) − tHL > θHu(q∗
L) − tLL. Therefore, we look for a robust mechanism MR in the
set of optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanisms which satis￿es the following condition:
θHu(q∗
H) − tHL = θHu(q∗
L) − tLL + α, (20)
where α is strictly positive and small. Recall that there exists a continuum of optimal weakly
collusion-proof mechanisms; hence, it might be the case that at least one of them satis￿es (20)
for some α > 0. The next proposition characterizes MR and describes some of its properties.
Proposition 14 Consider the mechanism MR ≡
'
qR,tR“
where qR = q∗ and tR solves the
following linear system, in which α > 0 and β > 0 are small numbers36
(BIRL), (BICH), (CICHH,HL)

















L) ≥ V 1
1 (q∗
H + q∗




(a) MR is optimal under no coalition formation and weakly collusion-proof.
(b) there is no belief of buyer i (after a rejection of S0 by buyer j 6= i) which supports an
equilibrium of MR in which at least one type of buyer j is better oﬀ than in the truthtelling
equilibrium;
(c) in MR,r e p o r t i n gL is strictly dominant for each L-type, while each H-type strictly prefers
reporting H (L) if his opponent plays L (H).
According to Proposition 14,37 when the seller oﬀers MR, both buyers accept S0 and
35T h a ti st h ec a s ew h e nM
R is oﬀered, as Proposition 14 below states.
36(CIC
β
HL,LL) below is obtained by adding β to the right hand side of constraint (CICHL,LL).
37We note that the result (b) in Proposition 14 [and (b) in Proposition 13] is stronger than Proposition 9 in
Laﬀont and Martimort (2000). Indeed, their result refers to the notion of rati￿ability [see Cramton and Palfrey
(1995)], which allows buyer i to have only ￿reasonable￿ or ￿consistent￿ beliefs about θ
j.I nc o n t r a s t ,w ed on o t
need any ￿sophisticated￿ argument in order to make our point: simply no beliefs of i support buyer j￿s rejection
of S
0.
30truthtelling is strictly dominant for each L-type and serially weakly dominant for each H-type.
Actually, MR admits two (asymmetric) non-truthful equilibria: One in which buyer 1 reports
truthfully and each type of buyer 2 reports L and the other in which buyer 2 reports truthfully
and each type of buyer 1 reports L. However, it seems reasonable to discard them because
they both involve the use of iteratively weakly dominated strategies and are Pareto dominated
for buyers by the truthful equilibrium. We also note that there exist a continuum of robust
m e c h a n i s m ss i n c ew ec a n￿nd a robust one for each positive small α.
8C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We found that if the seller uses simple sale mechanisms in which the quantity sold to a buyer
and his payment depend solely on his own report, buyers can realize strict gains at the seller￿s
loss by coordinating their purchases and reallocating the goods. However, we showed that when
the seller judiciously designs her mechanism by exploiting the transaction costs in coalition
formation, buyer coalition does not hurt her and, in particular, the buyers are unable to
implement eﬃcient arbitrage. We also showed that the optimal outcome can be implemented
through a menu of two-part tariﬀs.
Some might ￿nd unnatural the feature of the optimal collusion-proof mechanisms that a
buyer￿s payment depends on the other buyer￿s report while the quantity he receives is indepen-
dent of such a report. However, this is due to the fact that we focused on the case of constant
marginal cost. In a more general environment with variable marginal cost, (i) our main result
still holds and (ii) even without buyer coalition, both the quantity received by a buyer and his
payment will depend on the other￿s report under dominant strategy implementation. Further-
more, the feature that a buyer￿s payment depends on the other buyer￿s report exists in Vickrey
auctions, where the price that a winner pays depends on other bidders￿ bids.
Our results suggest that buyer coalitions are likely to emerge either when they have better
information about each other￿s preferences than the seller has, or when the seller is constrained
to use a restricted set of contracts such that a buyer￿s payment cannot depend on other buyers￿
actions. For instance, when there are a large number of buyers (possibly a mass of buyers),
the seller may have incomplete information about their number and identities. This would
impose restrictions on the set of contracts available to the seller, as in Alger (1999). It would
be interesting to study the case in which the seller can use only individual contracts: i.e., the
quantity sold to a buyer and his payment do not depend on what other buyers do. In this
setting, the collusion-proofness principle might not hold and the optimal mechanism might
31involve letting collusion occur.38
APPENDIX
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
The arguments of the proof for the single-buyer model show that (BICH) and (BIRL) bind
in the optimum. After replacing in Π the transfers as obtained from (BICH) and (BIRL)
written with equality, (i)-(ii) emerge as necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the optimum
and (BICL) and (BIRH) are automatically satis￿ed.
Proof of Proposition 2(b)




mentioned in the statement
of Proposition 2(b) is formally de￿ned as follows. For simplicity, let φd
jk = φd(θj,θk), xid
jk,e φ =
xid(θj,θk,e φ) and yid
jk = yid(θj,θk) with j,k ∈ {H,L}.
Reports manipulations: φd















HL =￿ x>0,w i t h￿ x close to 0,
x2d
HL = −￿ x; x2d
LH = −x1d















LH =￿ y, y2d
HL = y1d
LH = −￿ y;
y1d
LL = y2d
LL =0 , where ￿ y>0 is still to be de￿ned.
In words, an HH-coalition reports HL; then goods and payments are equally shared be-
tween the buyers. A coalition HL or LH reports LL; then goods are slightly reallocated from
L-type to H-type and H-type pays ￿ y to L-type.
We prove that for a small ￿ x>0 there exists a ￿ y>0 such that (BICS) are satis￿ed
and (BIRS) are slack ￿ (BB : x) and (BB : y) are satis￿ed by de￿nition. Therefore, Sd
is feasible and strictly increases the payoﬀ of each buyer type with respect to playing Md
non-cooperatively.
38Another direction for extension is to consider diﬀerent timing for buyer coalitions as Laﬀont and Martimort
(1997) discuss. To focus on coordination of purchases and reallocation, we adopted the timing chosen by Laﬀont
and Martimort (1997, 2000) but the analysis can be extended to a timing in which buyers can form a coalition
after receiving the seller￿s oﬀer and before deciding whether to accept or reject the oﬀer. Independently, deQuiedt
(2002) recently studied collusion with this timing in auctions.





,e φ)=1for some e φ ∈ Θ





)=e φ (see Section 2.2).
40Since the report manipulation is deterministic, we do not write e φ in x
id
jk,e φ.
32Let b qH ≡ q∗
L +￿ x, b qL ≡ q∗
L − ￿ x and consider constraint (BICS
H):
pL[θHu(b qH) − θLu(q∗













L)+( 1− pL)[θHu(b qL) − θLu(q∗
L)+￿ y] (21)
Let ￿ y =￿ y ≡ θH[u(q∗
L) − u(b qL)] > 0, so that (i) the right hand side of (21) is equal to
UMd
(θH)=( ∆θ)u(q∗
L);( i i )i f￿ x =0 , then (21) is strictly satis￿ed and therefore, when ￿ x>0
is close to 0, (21) is still strictly satis￿ed and (BIRS
H) is strictly satis￿ed as well; (iii) (BIRS
L)
holds strictly. Given a small ￿ x>0, consider increasing ￿ y above ￿ y until the point at which
(21) binds. Then, (BIRS
H) still holds strictly since the right hand side of (21) increased above
UMd
(θH);c l e a r l y ,(BIRS
L) holds strictly as well since now ￿ y>￿ y. In order to prove that
(BICS
L) is satis￿ed, add up (BICS
L) and (BICS
H) (which binds) to obtain an inequality which





2 > b qL. Therefore, Sd satis￿es (BICS) and (BIRS)
and the payoﬀ of each type of buyer is strictly larger than from playing Md non-cooperatively.
Thus, with Md, the buyer coalition strictly reduces the seller￿s pro￿tb e c a u s e( i )i nt h e
states of nature in which reports are manipulated, the quantity sold to buyers is smaller than
under truthtelling, which reduces the surplus generated by the trade and (ii) each type of buyer
obtains a higher payoﬀ than with truthtelling.41
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
The proof is omitted since it is a straightforward adaptation of the proof of Proposition 3 in
Laﬀont and Martimort (2000).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
We are interested in sale mechanisms such that L-type￿s incentive constraint is not binding.
Since we are ￿nding conditions under which S0 is optimal for the third party, the incentive
constraint of L-type will be slack in the side mechanism as well. In what follows, for the sake
of brevity, let xi
jk,e φ denote xi(θj,θk,e φ) with j,k ∈ {H,L}. Likewise, p
φ
jk,e φ denotes pφ(θj,θk,e φ).
41Actually, S
d may not be the optimal side mechanism against M
d. In particular, goods are not eﬃciently
reallocated within HL-coalition since otherwise we are not sure of whether (BIR
S) and (BIC
S) can all be
satis￿ed. However, if the third party chooses the optimal side mechanism against M
d, then still the pro￿ti s
smaller than if M
d is played non-cooperatively.
33The third-party maximizes the following objective,




HH,e φ) − t1(e φ)+θHu(q2(e φ)+x2






LH,e φ) − t1(e φ)+θHu(q2(e φ)+x2






HL,e φ) − t1(e φ)+θLu(q2(e φ)+x2







LL,e φ) − t1(e φ)+θLu(q2(e φ)+x2
LL,e φ) − t2(e φ)]
subject to the following constraints.
￿ Budget balance constraints: for the quantity reallocation
2 X
i=1
xi(θ1,θ2,e φ)=0 , for any (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2 and any e φ ∈ Θ2;
for the side transfers
2 X
i=1
yi(θ1,θ2)=0 , for any (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2,
































LH,e φ) − t1(e φ) − y1
LH],














HH,e φ) − t1(e φ) − y1
HH] ≥ UM(θH),














LH,e φ) − t1(e φ) − y1
LH] ≥ UM(θL),
￿ H-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint for buyer 2 : (BICS
2 (θH))
34￿ H-type￿s acceptance constraint for buyer 2: (BIRS
2(θH))










We introduce the following multipliers:
￿ ρx(θ1,θ2,e φ) for the budget-balance constraint for the quantity reallocation in state
(θ1,θ2,e φ),
￿ ρy(θ1,θ2) for the budget-balance constraint for the side-transfers in state (θ1,θ2),
￿ δi for the H-type￿s Bayesian incentive constraint concerning buyer i,
￿ vi
H for the H-type￿s acceptance constraint concerning buyer i,
￿ vi
L for the L-type￿s acceptance constraint concerning buyer i.
We de￿ne the Lagrangian function as follows:
























Step 1: Optimizing with respect to yi(θ1,θ2)
After optimizing with respect to yi
HH,w eh a v e :
ρ
y
HH − δi(1 − pL) − vi
H(1 − pL)=0 , for i =1 ,2.
After optimizing with respect to y1
HL and y2
HL respectively, we have:
ρ
y




HL + δ2(1 − pL) − v2
L(1 − pL)=0
After optimizing with respect to y1
LH and y2
LH respectively, we have:
ρ
y
LH + δ1(1 − pL) − v1
L(1 − pL)=0 ;
ρ
y
LH − δ2pL − v2
HpL =0
After optimizing with respect to yi
LL,w eh a v e :
ρ
y
LL + δipL − vi
LpL =0 , for i =1 ,2.
35In what follows, without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to symmetric multipliers:
δ ≡ δ1 = δ2, vH ≡ v1
H = v2
H, vL ≡ v1
L = v2
L
From the above equations, we have:
pL(δ + vH)=( 1− pL)(vL − δ)
Step 2: Optimizing with respect to xi(θ1,θ2,e φ) given pφ(θ1,θ2,e φ)
For simplicity, let ρx
jk,e φ = ρx(θj,θk,e φ).
After optimizing with respect to xi
HH,e φ,w eh a v e : 42
ρx
HH,e φ + p
φ
HH,e φ(1 − pL + δ + vH)(1 − pL)θHu0(qi(e φ)+xi
HH,e φ)=0 , for i =1 ,2, and any e φ ∈ Θ2.
The above equations imply that q1(e φ)+x1
HH,e φ = q2(e φ)+x2
HH,e φ for any e φ ∈ Θ2.S i n c e
x1
HH,e φ+x2




each e φ.H e n c e ,a n yt o t a lq u a n t i t yw h i c hi sa v a i l a b l et oHH−coalition is always split equally
between the two buyers. We will see that the same result holds for LL−coalition.
After optimizing with respect to x1
HL,e φ and x2
HL,e φ respectively, we have:
ρx
HL,e φ + p
φ
HL,e φ(1 − pL + δ + vH)pLθHu0(q1(e φ)+x1
HL,e φ)=0 , for any e φ ∈ Θ2,
ρx
HL,e φ + p
φ
HL,e φ(pLθL − δθH + vLθL)(1 − pL)u0(q2(e φ)+x2
HL,e φ)=0 , for any e φ ∈ Θ2.










HL,e φ), for any e φ ∈ Θ2,
where † ≡ δ
1−pL+δ+vH.S i n c eθ†
L = θL−
1−pL
pL (∆θ)†, any total quantity available to HL−coalition




HL,e φ), for any e φ ∈ Θ2.
After optimizing with respect to x1
LH,e φ and x2
LH,e φ respectively, we have:
ρx
LH,e φ + p
φ
LH,e φ(pLθL − δθH + vLθL)(1 − pL)u0(q1(e φ)+x1
LH,e φ)=0 , for any e φ ∈ Θ2,
ρx
LH,e φ + p
φ
LH,e φ(1 − pL + δ + vH)pLθHu0(q2(e φ)+x2
LH,e φ)=0 , for any e φ ∈ Θ2.
42In homogeneous coalitions, HH and LL, the reallocation cannot lead to corner solutions. In HL−coalition,
instead, this is conceivable but it is not going to occur when the seller designs the sale mechanism optimally.
Hence, we only consider interior solutions for the reallocation problem.




LH,e φ), for any e φ ∈ Θ2.
After optimizing with respect to xi
LL,e φ,w eh a v e :
ρx
LL,e φ + p
φ
LL,e φ(pLθL − δθH + vLθL)pLu0(qi(e φ)+xi
LL,e φ)=0 , for i =1 ,2 and any e φ ∈ Θ2.
The above equations imply that q1(e φ)+x1
LL,e φ = q2(e φ)+x2
LL,e φ.S i n c ex1
LL,e φ + x2
LL,e φ =0from




Step 3: Optimizing with respect to φ(θ1,θ2)
Recall that we want to ￿nd conditions under which the third party optimally requires any
coalition with (θ1,θ2)=( θj,θk) to report (θj,θk),i . e . ,φ(θj,θk)=( θj,θk).
￿ HH coalition:





















































) − t1(￿ φ) − t2(￿ φ)
)
.
Finally, notice that the above conditions are equivalent to (6)-(11).
Some missing elements in the proof to Proposition 5
The transfers t∗∗ in M∗∗ are given as follows:
t∗∗
HL =

























































































Lemma for the proof of Proposition 5











for any x>0 and † ≥ 0.
Proof. We have V2(x)=2 θHu(x
2) and V †
0(x)=2 θ†
Lu(x








2). For an HL-coalition, let us consider for simplicity interior allocations













L(x)].S i n c eu0 is strictly decreasing and θH > θ†















Proof that β de￿ned at page 20 is negative





L + z) − u(q∗
L)]; we want to show that g(q∗
H−q∗
L) < 0
because β = g(q∗
H − q∗











L + z). g0(z) < 0 is
equivalent to q1
H(2q∗
L + z) >q ∗
L + z,w h i c hh o l d sf o r∀z ∈ [0,q∗
H − q∗




















L(x)] for x =2 q∗
L + z.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
We assume here that the seller proposes the menu of two-part tariﬀs {T∗∗
H ,T∗∗
L }.W e
consider ￿rst the case without buyer coalition and then examine the case with buyer coalition.
38Proof that with {T∗∗
H ,T∗∗
L }, under buyers￿ noncooperative behavior the same out-
come arises as with M∗∗. For the sake of brevity, let ﬂ p ≡ θHu0(q∗
L) a n dr e c a l lt h a ti fb u y e r s
choose tariﬀs (T∗∗
j ,T∗∗
k ), then the buyer who chose T∗∗
j (resp. T∗∗
k ) faces the marginal price ﬂ p
for quantities above q∗
j (resp. q∗
k) and the marginal price c for quantities below q∗
j (resp. q∗
k).
Suppose that buyer 2 chooses the tariﬀ d e s i g n e df o rh i st y p ea n dc o n s i d e rt h ed e c i s i o n
problem of H-type of buyer 1 (buyers are ex ante symmetric). If he selects T∗∗
H , then he buys
the quantity which maximizes θHu(q)−cq1[q≤q∗
H]−[cq∗
H +ﬂ p(q − q∗
H)]1[q>q∗
H] and the maximum
is achieved at q = q∗




L). Suppose now that he selects T∗∗
L . Then, he would buy the quantity
which maximizes θHu(q) − cq1[q≤q∗
L] − [cq∗
L +ﬂ p(q − q∗
L)]1[q>q∗
L]. The maximum is attained at
q = q∗
L. Given that the expected ￿xed fee is pLA∗∗
LL+(1−pL)A∗∗
LH, his expected payoﬀ is again
(∆θ)u(q∗
L).
Consider now L-type of buyer 1. If he chooses T∗∗
L , he buys the quantity which maximizes
θLu(q) − cq1[q≤q∗
L] − [cq∗
L +ﬂ p(q − q∗
L)]1[q>q∗
L].T h es o l u t i o ni sq = q∗
L and his expected payoﬀ
( t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n t￿xed fees) is 0.I fh ec h o o s e sT∗∗
H ,t h e nh ew i l lc o n s u m eq u a n t i t yqFB
L such
that θLu0(qFB
L )=c and his expected payoﬀ would be,
θLu(qFB
L ) − cqFB
L − pLA∗∗
HL − (1 − pL)A∗∗
HH.






H,w en e e dt op r o v et h a t
θLu(qFB





Notice that the right hand side of (22) would be smaller if q∗
H were replaced by qFB
L <q ∗
H.
Therefore, (22) holds if it is satis￿ed when q∗
H is replaced by qFB
L .W h e n q∗
H is replaced by
qFB
L , (22) boils down to (∆θ)u(q∗
L) < (∆θ)u(qFB
L ),w h i c hh o l d ss i n c eq∗
L <q FB
L .
Proof that allowing coalition formation does not aﬀect the outcome We now study
the case with buyer coalition. We ￿rst de￿ne the third-party￿s program when the seller oﬀers
am e n uo ft w o - p a r t st a r i ﬀs. The side-contract takes the form:
{φ(e θ),qi(e θ,e φ),x i(e θ,e φ),yi(e θ); i =1 ,2},
where e θ
i




).L e tφ(•) be the tariﬀ selection
function that tells each buyer (possibly randomly) which tariﬀ to select as a function of e θ.L e t
e φ ∈ Θ2 denote a realized outcome of φ(•) and let pφ(e θ,e φ) denote the probability that the third
party requests the buyers to choose the tariﬀs e φ when they report him e θ.L e tqi(e θ,e φ) denote
39the quantity which the third party recommends buyer i to buy as a function of (e θ,e φ).L e t
xi(e θ,e φ) denote the reallocation function which determines the quantity that buyer i receives
from the third-party. Therefore, qi(e θ,e φ)+xi(e θ,e φ) is the total quantity received by buyer i.
yi(•) is the monetary transfer from buyer i to the third party as de￿n e di nS e c t i o n2 . 2 . W e
impose the usual ex post budget balance constraints for the reallocation of goods and for the
side transfers. Finally, observe that the payment of buyer i to the seller depends both on the
chosen tariﬀs e φ and the quantity bought qi(e θ,e φ). Hence, it is denoted by ti(qi(e θ,e φ),e φ).L e t
us de￿ne the null side-contract, denoted by S0,a sS0 ≡ {φ(•)=Id(•),qi(•)=q∗(e θ
i
),x 1(•)=




= θH (e θ
i
= θL).
As in De￿nition 1, we say that a side-contract S∗ = {φ∗(•),qi∗(•),x i∗(•),yi∗(•)} is coalition-









































for any (θi,e θ
i
) ∈ Θ2;
(BIRS) Ui(θi) ≥ UM(θi), for any θi ∈ Θ;
(BB : x) x1(θ1,θ2,e φ)+x2(θ1,θ2,e φ)=0 , for any (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2 and any e φ ∈ Θ2
(BB : y) y1(θ1,θ2)+y2(θ1,θ2)=0 , for any (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2.
In what follows, for the sake of brevity we use qi
jk,e φ instead of qi(θj,θk,e φ) with jk ∈ {HH,HL,LH,LL}.
p
φ
jk,e φ and xi
jk,e φ are similarly de￿ned. The third-party maximizes the following objective






HH,e φ + xi







LH,e φ + x1
LH,e φ)+θHu(q2










HL,e φ + x1
HL,e φ)+θLu(q2













LL,e φ + xi
LL,e φ) − ti(qi
LL,e φ,e φ)]
40subject to the usual budget balance constraints for the quantity reallocation and for the side
transfers and, in addition,







HL,e φ + x1
HL,e φ) − t1(q1








HH,e φ + x1
HH,e φ) − t1(q1








LL,e φ + x1
LL,e φ) − t1(q1








LH,e φ + x1
LH,e φ) − t1(q1
LH,e φ,e φ) − y1
LH],







LH,e φ + x2
LH,e φ) − t2(q2








HH,e φ + x2
HH,e φ) − t2(q2








LL,e φ + x2
LL,e φ) − t2(q2








HL,e φ + x2
HL,e φ) − t2(q2
HL,e φ,e φ) − y2
HL],







HL,e φ + x1
HL,e φ) − t1(q1








HH,e φ + x1
HH,e φ) − t1(q1
HH,e φ,e φ) − y1
HH] ≥ UM(θH)







LH,e φ + x2
LH,e φ) − t2(q2








HH,e φ + x2
HH,e φ) − t2(q2
HH,e φ,e φ) − y2
HH] ≥ UM(θH)







LL,e φ + x1
LL,e φ) − t1(q1








LH,e φ + x1
LH,e φ) − t1(q1
LH,e φ,e φ) − y1
LH] ≥ UM(θL)







LL,e φ + x2
LL,e φ) − t2(q2








HL,e φ + x2
HL,e φ) − t2(q2
HL,e φ,e φ) − y2
HL] ≥ UM(θL)
We introduce the same multipliers and Lagrangian function as in the proof of Proposition 4.
Step 1 here is similar to the step 1 in the proof of Proposition 4: we obtain vL = δ+
pL
1−pL(δ+vH).
Step 2: Optimization with respect to xi




After optimizing with respect to xi
HH,e φ:43
ρx
HH,e φ + p
φ
HH,e φ(1 − pL + δ + vH)(1 − pL)θHu0(qi
HH,e φ + xi
HH,e φ)=0 , for i =1 ,2 and any e φ ∈ Θ2.
The above equations imply q1
HH,e φ + x1
HH,e φ = q2
HH,e φ + x2
HH,e φ.S i n c ex1
HH,e φ + x2
HH,e φ =0from
the budget balance constraint, we have qi
HH,e φ + xi
HH,e φ =( q1
HH,e φ + q2
HH,e φ)/2 for each e φ ∈ Θ2.
After optimizing with respect to x1
HL,e φ and x2
HL,e φ respectively, we have:
ρx
HL,e φ + p
φ
HL,e φ(1 − pL + δ + vH)pLθHu0(q1
HL,e φ + x1
HL,e φ)=0 , for any e φ ∈ Θ2,
ρx
HL,e φ + p
φ
HL,e φ(pLθL − δθH + vLθL)(1 − pL)u0(q2
HL,e φ + x2
HL,e φ)=0 , for any e φ ∈ Θ2.
Since vL = δ +
pL
1−pL(δ + vH), we obtain from the two above equations:
θHu0(q1
HL,e φ + x1
HL,e φ)=θ†
Lu0(q2
HL,e φ + x2
HL,e φ), for any e φ ∈ Θ2. (23)
Similarly, after optimizing with respect to x1
LH,e φ and x2
LH,e φ respectively, we obtain
θHu0(q2
LH,e φ + x2
LH,e φ)=θ†
Lu0(q1
LH,e φ + x1
LH,e φ), for any e φ ∈ Θ2.
43The remark about interior solutions for the reallocation problem which we made in the proof of proposition
4 applies here as well.
42After optimizing with respect to xi
LL,e φ,w e￿nd
ρx
LL,e φ + p
φ
LL,e φ(pLθL − δθH + vLθL)pLu0(qi
LL,e φ + xi
LL,e φ)=0 , for i =1 ,2 and any e φ ∈ Θ2.
The above equations imply q1
LL,e φ + x1
LL,e φ = q2
LL,e φ + x2
LL,e φ.S i n c ex1
LL,e φ + x2
LL,e φ =0from the
budget balance constraint, we have qi
LL,e φ + xi
LL,e φ =( q1
LL,e φ + q2
LL,e φ)/2 for any e φ ∈ Θ2.
Step 3: Optimizing with respect to qi
jk,e φ given p
φ
jk,e φ
Given e φ, a realized outcome of φ(•),l e tﬂ q1
e φ (resp. ﬂ q2
e φ) denote the quantity level at which




H. We consider the third party￿s optimization problem with respect to
(q1
jk,e φ,q2
jk,e φ).L e t m ∈ {0,1,2} denote the number of buyers with H-type in the coalition
with (θ1,θ2)=( θj,θk). Then, the total surplus that the coalition derives from consuming
quantity x is given by V †
m(x). Therefore, we can write the payoﬀ of the coalition as a function
of (q1
jk,e φ,q2
jk,e φ), without considering the ￿xed fees, as follows:
V †
m(q1
jk,e φ + q2
jk,e φ) − c(q1
jk,e φ + q2
jk,e φ) if q1
jk,e φ ≤ ﬂ q1
e φ and q2




jk,e φ + q2
jk,e φ) − ﬂ p(q1
jk,e φ − ﬂ q1
e φ) − c(ﬂ q1
e φ + q2
jk,e φ) if q1
jk,e φ > ﬂ q1
e φ and q2




jk,e φ + q2
jk,e φ) − ﬂ p(q2
jk,e φ − ﬂ q2
e φ) − c(q1
jk,e φ +ﬂ q2
e φ) if q1
jk,e φ ≤ ﬂ q1
e φ and q2




jk,e φ + q2
jk,e φ) − ﬂ p(q1
jk,e φ − ﬂ q1
e φ + q2
jk,e φ − ﬂ q2
e φ) − c(ﬂ q1
e φ +ﬂ q2
e φ) if q1
jk,e φ > ﬂ q1
e φ and q2
jk,e φ > ﬂ q2
e φ
(24)
For any e φ,w e￿nd below the maximum value of the function de￿n e di n( 2 4 )w i t hr e s p e c tt o
(q1
jk,e φ,q2
jk,e φ) ∈ R2
+. If we denote that maximum value by Ujk(e φ), then the net payoﬀ which jk
coalition receives if it reports e φ to the seller is Ujk(e φ) minus the ￿xed fees associated with e φ.
Step 4: Optimizing with respect to φ(θ1,θ2).
Instead of ￿nding conditions such that coalitions report truthfully and then verifying that
such conditions are satis￿e db yt h en u l ls i d em e c h a n i s mS0, we prove directly that S0 is optimal
for the third party when † =1 ,g i v e n{T∗∗
H ,T∗∗
L }.I no t h e rw o r d s ,o u rm e n uo ft w op a r tt a r i ﬀs
is weakly collusion-proof since we show that the third party will require each j-type to choose
the tariﬀ T∗∗
j and to buy quantity q∗
j.
HH coalition If HH coalition chooses (T∗∗
H ,T∗∗
H ) (which means p
φ
HH,HH =1 )t h e ni tb u y s
a total quantity q>0 in order to maximize V2(q) − cq1[q≤2q∗
H] − [c2q∗





2). The solution is q =2 q∗
H, therefore choosing (T∗∗
H ,T∗∗
H ) yields the
43coalition the same payoﬀ 2θHu(q∗
H)−2t∗
HH that is obtained by reporting HH in the mechanism
M∗∗.
If it chooses (T∗∗
H ,T∗∗
L ), then it should select (qH,q L) (quantities which are bought by the
buyer who chose T∗∗
H and T∗∗










L +ﬂ p(q − q∗
L)]1[q>q∗
L].C e r t a i n l y ,qH ≥ q∗
H and
qL ≥ q∗
L since marginal price is c for qH ≤ q∗
H and qL ≤ q∗
L while the marginal bene￿tf o r
HH coalition from having an additional unit of good when it owns total quantity q∗
H +q∗
L (or








2 ) >c . However, it is not optimal to set qH >q ∗
H
and/or qL >q ∗




2 ). This establishes that
￿ conditional on choosing (T∗∗
H ,T∗∗





LH a f t e rt a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h e￿xed fees. Therefore, choosing (T∗∗
H ,T∗∗
L ) yields
the coalition the same payoﬀ that is obtained by reporting HLin the mechanism M∗∗.
If it chooses (T∗∗
L ,T∗∗
L ), then it will buy the total quantity 2q∗






∂x < ﬂ p for q>2q∗
L ￿ and will pay 2t∗∗
LL overall. Hence, choosing (T∗∗
L ,T∗∗
L ) yields the
same payoﬀ that is obtained by reporting LLin the mechanism M∗∗.




HL coalition If HL coalition selects (T∗∗
H ,T∗∗
L ),t h e ni tc h o o s e sqH ≥ q∗
H and qL ≥ q∗
L
because the marginal price is c for qH <q ∗
H and qL <q ∗
L, and the marginal bene￿tf o rHL
coalition from having an additional unit of good when it owns total quantity q∗
H + q∗
L (or





∂x = c. Setting qH >q ∗
H and/or qL >q ∗




∂x if qH + qL >q ∗
H + q∗
L.
If it chooses (T∗∗
H ,T∗∗
H ), it will buy the total quantity q in order to maximize
V 1
1 (q) − cq1[q≤2q∗
H] − [c2q∗
H +ﬂ p(q − 2q∗
H)]1[q>2q∗
H]
Since the above objective is maximized at q = q∗
H + q∗
L, taking into account the ￿xed fees we
see that choosing (T∗∗
H ,T∗∗















By replacing the values of A∗∗
HH, A∗∗
HL and A∗∗
LH and recalling that (CICHH,HL) binds in M∗∗,













which can be proved by using the mean value theorem.
44If thecoalition chooses (T∗∗
L ,T∗∗









∂x < ﬂ p if q>2q∗
L. Recalling the value of A∗∗
LL,w e￿nd that choosing
(T∗∗
L ,T∗∗
L ) yields HL coalition the same payoﬀ that is obtained by reporting LLin M∗∗.S i n c e
(CICHL,LL) is satis￿ed in M∗∗,c h o o s i n g(T∗∗
L ,T∗∗
L ) is not better than (T∗∗
H ,T∗∗
L ).
LL coalition It is straightforward to ￿nd that LLcoalition buys total quantity 2q∗
L regardless
o ft h ec h o i c eo ft a r i ﬀs. Therefore, it will choose (T∗∗
L ,T∗∗
L ) if and only if the ￿xed fees are
larger for (T∗∗
H ,T∗∗
H ) and (T∗∗
H ,T∗∗
L ) than for (T∗∗
L ,T∗∗



























The latter inequality can be proved by using the mean value theorem.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7
Let xi
θ,e φ = xi(θ,e φ) represent the reallocation function. For expositional convenience, let
{q(θ),t(θ)} represent the symmetric sale mechanism introduced in Subsection 6.1, i.e., Mn =



































































































After writing down the Lagrangian function we can ￿nd the conditions under which the null
side mechanism solves this maximization problem. In particular, consider the m-coalition
θm,n−m =( H...HL...L): Under which conditions is the third party reporting truthfully and
not reallocating when e θ = θm,n−m?44 We describe such conditions by considering multipliers
such that δi = δ, vi
H = vH and vi
L = vL for any i.45 The manipulation and reallocation which
























































θm,n−m,e φ) − ti0




















θm,n−m,e φ) − ti0


























44The results we obtain below extend to any other m-coalition - i.e., the ones in which the m buyers with
H-type are not buyers 1 to m.










H ) and (BIR
iS
L ).
46where pH =1− pL and ρx
θm,n−m,e φ and ρ
y
θm,n−m are the Lagrangian multiplier associated with
the budget balance constraint for quantity reallocation and the side transfer.
Step 1: Optimizing with respect to side-transfers yi(θm,n−m)










L (δ − vL)=0for yi0
(θm,n−m) with m +1≤ i0 ≤ n
Therefore, we have




Step 2: Optimizing with respect to quantity reallocation xi
θm,n−m,e φ
From the ￿rst order conditions with respect to xi
θm,n−m,e φ,w eh a v e :f o r1 ≤ i ≤ m
ρx










for m +1≤ i0 ≤ n,
ρx




L θL + pm
Hpn−m−1











for (i,i0) ∈ {1,...,m}￿{ m +1 ,...,n} for any e φ ∈ Θ2
Therefore, conditional on that there is no manipulation of report, the third party does not
reallocate the goods in a m−coalition if there is † ∈ [0,1) such that (17) in the paper holds
Step 3: Optimizing with respect to report manipulation φ(θm,n−m)
The truthful (and deterministic) manipulation φ(θm,n−m)=θm,n−m is optimal if and only
if [after substituting (27) into (26)]



























θm,n−m,e φ and xi0






















Hence, (29) is equivalent to condition (a) in proposition 7.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one provided for n =2 .
First, the seller can choose † =1such that the third-party has the same virtual valuation as
she has; therefore, (17) holds at qn = q∗
n.
Second, there exist transfers t∗∗
n satisfying with equality (BICH), (BIRL) and (CICm+1,m)
(m =0 ,1,...,n−1) bind written with qn = q∗
n and ε =1 .L e tCn
m = n!
m!(n−m)!, so that writing













L (1 − pL)m−1tHm =( ∆θ)u(q∗
L)
(30)
Let us de￿ne ∆V 1
m ≡ V 1
m[mq∗
H +( n − m)q∗
L] − V 1
m[(m − 1)q∗
H +( n − m +1 ) q∗
L], m =1 ,...,n.
∆V 1
m represents the diﬀerence between the gross payoﬀ that m−coalition obtains by reporting
truthfully and the one that it obtains by reporting m − 1.C o n s t r a i n t s (CICm+1,m) written
with equality (m =0 ,1,...,n− 1) yield (tH1,t H2,...,tHn) as a function of (tL0,t L1,...,tLn−1)




          
          
tH1 = V 1
1 [q∗
H +( n − 1)q∗
L] − V 1
1 (nq∗
L) − (n − 1)tL1 + ntL0
= ∆V 1























After setting tL2 = tL3 = ... = tLn−1 =0(this is one of many possibilities) and substituting
(31) into (30), we obtain the following linear system in (tL0,t L1) which admits a (unique)
solution because the matrix of the unknowns is non-singular.
θLu(q∗
L)=pn−1
L tL0 +( n − 1)pn−2









tL0 − (n − 1)pn−1
L tL1






∂x for m =0 ,1...,n−1.
We consider for simplicity interior allocations because the seller optimally serves any type
of buyer.46 Then, q†
Hm(x) and q†

























∂x .S u p p o s eq†
Hm+1(x) ≥ q†
Hm(x). Then (i) the marginal utility of
each H-type is smaller in a (m +1 ) -coalition than in a m-coalition; (ii) we have q†
Lm+1(x) <
q†
Lm(x), which implies that the marginal utility of each L- t y p ei sh i g h e ri na( m+1 )-coalition












Lm for m =0 ,...,n−1,w e
argue as in the proof to Proposition 5 to conclude that M∗∗
n satis￿es all the coalition incentive
constraints.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9
As in the case of two types, when Θ = {θL,θM,θH} the optimal mechanisms when there
are two buyers are closely related to the optimal mechanism for the single-buyer model. In
particular, the quantity each buyer receives is independent of the report of the other buyer
and equal to the quantity he would obtain in the single-buyer setting, as the ￿r s tp a r to f
the statement describes. The transfers are such that the binding constraints are as in the
single-buyer model.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0








jk,e φ) − t1(e φ) − t2(e φ)
i
for j,k = L,M,H. Sjk denotes the expected real surplus of coalition jk given manipu-












jk,e φti(e φ) and yi
jk = yi(θj,θk). The third-party maximizes the following objec-
tive function:
p2
HSHH + pHpM(SHM + SMH)+pHpL(SHL + SLH)
+p2
MSMM + pMpL(SML+ SLM)+p2
LSLL
subject to the following constraints.
46T h ep r o o fc a nb es l i g h t l ym o d i ￿ed in order to cover the non-interior case.
49￿ Budget balance constraints: for the quantity reallocation
2 X
i=1
xi(θ1,θ2,e φ)=0 , for any (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2 and any e φ ∈ Θ2
for the side transfers
2 X
i=1
yi(θ1,θ2)=0 , for any (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2,






















































































































































We introduce the following multipliers:
￿ ρx(θ1,θ2,e φ) for the budget-balance constraint for the quantity reallocation in state
(θ1,θ2,e φ),
￿ ρy(θ1,θ2) for the budget-balance constraint for the side-transfers in state (θ1,θ2),
￿ δi
HM for HM Bayesian incentive constraint concerning buyer i,
￿ δi
ML for ML Bayesian incentive constraint concerning buyer i,
￿ vi
H for H-type￿s acceptance constraint concerning buyer i,
￿ vi
M for M-type￿s acceptance constraint concerning buyer i,
￿ vi
L for L-type￿s acceptance constraint concerning buyer i.
We de￿ne the Lagrangian as follows:
L = p2
HSHH + pHpM(SHM + SMH)+pHpL(SHL + SLH)+p2




































Step 1: Optimization with respect to yi(θ1,θ2)
After optimizing with respect to yi





H)pH =0 , for i =1 ,2.
51After optimizing with respect to y1
HM and y2












After optimizing with respect to y1
HL and y2











After optimizing with respect to y1
MH and y2












After optimizing with respect to y1
MM and y2






M)pM =0for i =1 ,2.
After optimizing with respect to y1
ML and y2












After optimizing with respect to y1
LH and y2











After optimizing with respect to y1
LM and y2












After optimizing with respect to yi





L)pL =0 , for i =1 ,2.
In what follows, we restrict our attention to symmetric multipliers (this is without loss of
generality, as Proposition 11 establishes47):
δHM ≡ δ1
HM = δ2





H,v M ≡ v1
M = v2
M,v L ≡ v1
L = v2
L.
47Indeed, we just need to show that there exists a system of multipliers such that the third-party ￿nds it
optimal to oﬀer the null-side contract.
52From the above conditions about side transfers we have:
pH
pL
(vL − δML)=δHM + vH =
pH
pM
(δML+ vM − δHM)
Step 2: Optimizing with respect to xi(θ1,θ2,e φ)
As in the proof of Proposition 4, the side-contract may specify a stochastic manipulation.
However, the reallocation occurs after the outcome of the stochastic manipulation has been
observed. Here, we optimize the third party￿s payoﬀ with respect to xi
jk,e φ for any e φ ∈ Θ2.
After optimizing with respect to xi
HH,e φ,w eh a v e : 48
ρx
HH,e φ + p
φ
HH,e φ(pH + δHM + vH)pHθHu0(qi(e φ)+xi
HH,e φ)=0 , for i =1 ,2
The above equations imply q1(e φ)+x1
HH,e φ = q2(e φ)+x2
HH,e φ.S i n c ex1
HH,e φ+x2
HH,e φ =0from the
budget balance constraint, we have qi(e φ)+xi
HH,e φ =
q1(e φ)+q2(e φ)
2 , i =1 ,2, for any e φ ∈ Θ2.
After optimizing with respect to x1
HM,e φ and x2
HM,e φ respectively, we have:
ρx
HM,e φ + p
φ
HM,e φpM(pH + δHM + vH)θHu0(q1(e φ)+x1
HM,e φ)=0 ,
ρx
HM,e φ + p
φ
HM,e φpH[θMpM + θM(δML+ vM − δHM) − ∆HδHM]u0(q2(e φ)+x2
HM,e φ)=0 .
De￿ne †HM ≡ δHM
pH+δHM+vH ∈ [0,1) and recall that θ†
M ≡ θM −
pH
pM ∆H†HM.S i n c e (δHM +
vH)pM = pH(δML+ vM − δHM), we obtain from the two above equations:
pM(pH + δHM + vH)θHu0(q1(e φ)+x1
HM,e φ)






HM,e φ) for any e φ ∈ Θ2
After optimizing with respect to x1
HL,e φ and x2
HL,e φ respectively, we have:
ρx
HL,e φ + p
φ
HL,e φpL(pH + δHM + vH)θHu0(q1(e φ)+x1
HL,e φ)=0 ,
ρx
HL,e φ + p
φ
HL,e φ[θLpH(pL + vL − δML) − pH∆MδML]u0(q2(e φ)+x2
HL,e φ)=0 .
48In homogeneous coalitions ￿ HH, MM and LL ￿ the reallocation cannot lead to corner solutions. In HM,
HL and ML coalitions instead, this is conceivable but is not going to occur when the seller designs the sale
mechanism optimally. Hence, we only consider interior solutions for the reallocation problem.
53De￿ne †ML ≡ δML
pH+δHM+vH = †HM
δML
δHM ≥ 0 and recall that θ†
L ≡ θL −
pH
pL ∆M†ML.S i n c e
pH(vL − δML)=pL(δHM + vH), from the two above equations we obtain:
pL(pH + δHM + vH)θHu0(q1(e φ)+x1
HL,e φ)






HL,e φ) for any e φ ∈ Θ2
After optimizing with respect to xi
MM,e φ,w eh a v e :
ρx
MM,e φ + p
φ
MM,e φ[θMpM − ∆HδHM + θM(δML + vM − δHM)]pMu0(qi(e φ)+xi
MM,e φ)=0 , for i =1 ,2.
The above equations imply q1(e φ)+x1
MM,e φ = q2(e φ)+x2
MM,e φ.S i n c ex1
MM,e φ + x2
MM,e φ =0from
the budget balance constraint, we have qi(e φ)+xi
MM,e φ =
q1(e φ)+q2(e φ)
2 , i =1 ,2 for any e φ ∈ Θ2.
After optimizing with respect to x1
ML,e φ and x2
ML,e φ respectively, we have:
ρx
ML,e φ + p
φ
ML,e φpL[pMθM − ∆HδHM + θM(δML+ vM − δHM)]u0(q1(e φ)+x1
ML,e φ)=0 ,
ρx
ML,e φ + p
φ
ML,e φpM[θL(pL − δML+ vL) − ∆MδML)]u0(q2(e φ)+x2
ML,e φ)=0 .
Since vL −δML =
pL
pH(δHM +vH) and δML+vM −δHM =
pM
pH (δHM +vH), from the two above
equations we obtain:
[θMpLpM(pH + vH + δHM) − ∆HpLpHδHM]u0(q1(e φ)+x1
ML,e φ)






ML,e φ) for any e φ ∈ Θ2.
After optimizing with respect to xi
LL,e φ,w eh a v e :
ρx
LL,e φ + p
φ
LL,e φ[θLpL − ∆MδML + θL(vL − δML)]pLu0(qi(e φ)+xi
LL,e φ)=0 , for i =1 ,2.
The above equations imply q1(e φ)+x1
LL,e φ = q2(e φ)+x2
LL,e φ.S i n c ex1
LL,e φ + x2
LL,e φ =0from the
budget balance constraint, we have qi(e φ)+xi
LL,e φ =
q1(e φ)+q2(e φ)
2 , i =1 ,2, for any e φ ∈ Θ2.
Since we are considering symmetric multipliers, we can infer that
(i) after optimizing with respect to x1
MH,e φ and x2




MH,e φ) for any e φ ∈ Θ2;
(ii) after optimizing with respect to x1
LH,e φ and x2




LH,e φ) for any e φ ∈ Θ2;
(iii) after optimizing with respect to x1
LM,e φ and x2





LM,e φ) for any e φ ∈ Θ2.
Therefore, conditional on that there is no manipulation of report, i.e., φ(θj,θk)=( θj,θk)
for any jk, the third party will not reallocate the goods among the buyers if there is an
† ∈ [0,1) ￿ [0,+∞) such that:
θ†
ju0(q1(θj,θk)) = θ†
ku0(q2(θj,θk)) for j,k ∈ {H,M,L}.
For non-homogeneous coalitions this is equivalent to condition (19).
Step 3: Optimizing with respect to φ(θ1,θ2)
Let Sjk(e φ) ≡ θju(q1(e φ)+x1
jk,e φ)+θku(q2(e φ)+x2
jk,e φ)−t1(e φ)−t2(e φ) denote the real surplus of
jk coalition when reports to the seller are manipulated into e φ. Likewise, S1
jk(e φ) ≡ θju(q1(e φ)+
x1
jk,e φ) − t1(e φ), S2
jk(e φ) ≡ θku(q2(e φ)+x2
jk,e φ) − t2(e φ) and ui
jk(e φ) ≡ u(qi(e φ)+xi
jk,e φ).U s i n gt h i s
notation we ￿nd conditions under which the third party optimally requires any coalition with
(θ1,θ2)=( θj,θk) to report (θj,θk).
￿ HH coalition
(θH,θH) ∈ arg max
e φ∈Θ2
[p2
H + pH(vH + δHM)]SHH(e φ)










(θH,θM) ∈ arg max
e φ∈Θ2
(
pHpMSHM(e φ)+pM(vH + δHM)S1
HM(e φ)
−pH∆HδHMu2
HM(e φ)+pH(vM + δML− δHM)S2
HM(e φ)
)
=a r g m a x
e φ∈Θ2
n
pM(pH + vH + δHM)SHM(e φ) − pH∆HδHMu2
HM(e φ)
o























(θH,θL) ∈ arg max
e φ∈Θ2
(
pHpLSHL(e φ)+pL(vH + δHM)S1
HL(e φ)
+pH(vL − δML)S2
HL(e φ) − pH∆MδMLu2
HL(e φ)
)




































=a r g m a x
e φ∈Θ2
(






















) − t1(e φ) − t2(e φ)
)
￿ ML coalition:
(θM,θL) ∈ arg max
e φ∈Θ2
(
pMpLSML(e φ) − δHMpL∆Hu1




ML(e φ)) + vLpMS2
ML(e φ)
)
=a r g m a x
e φ∈Θ2
(































LL(e φ)) + vLpLSLL(e φ)
)

















) − t1(e φ) − t2(e φ)
)
For HM coalition, for instance, we have θHu1
HM(e φ)+θ†
Mu2
HM(e φ) − t1(e φ) − t2(e φ)=
V ε









HM(e φ) − t1(e φ) − t2(e φ)
o
is
equivalent to (18) with jk = HM. The same remark applies to any other coalition and justi￿es
the whole condition (18).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 1
The proof of Proposition 11 depends on whether q∗
H + q∗
L ≥ 2q∗
M or the reverse inequality
holds (notice that q∗
H + q∗
L > 2q∗




M, but our argument below can be adapted to the case of q∗
H + q∗
L < 2q∗
M ￿s e e
the end of the proof. The proof consists of three steps.
Claim 1 If θv
M ≥ θv







then there exists †∗ such that θ†∗
M = θ†∗
L = ﬂ θ
v
ML. In both cases, the no arbitrage constraints
(19) are satis￿ed at q = q∗ and † = †∗.
Claim 2 Let α ≡ V †∗
MM(2q∗
M) − V †∗
MM(q∗
M + q∗
L) − [V †∗
ML(2q∗
M) − V †∗
ML(q∗
M + q∗
L)] ≥ 0.I f
t is such that the following local downward coalition incentive constraints bind, then all the
coalition incentive constraints are satis￿ed by mechanism {q∗,t} when † = †∗:49
V †∗
HH(2q∗
H) − 2tHH ≥ V †∗
HH(q∗
H + q∗




M) − tHM − tMH ≥ V †∗
HM(q∗
H + q∗




L) − tHL − tLH ≥ V †∗
HL(2q∗
M) − 2tMM (CICHL,MM)
V †∗
MM(2q∗
M) − 2tMM ≥ V †∗
MM(q∗
M + q∗





L) − tML− tLM ≥ V †∗
ML(2q∗
L) − 2tLL (CICML,LL)
49We note that (CICMM,ML) is modi￿ed with respect to the true constraint (CICMM,ML).I n o r d e r t o
understand why α is introduced in (CIC
modi￿ed
MM,ML), see the proof of Claim 2 when dealing with (CICHL,ML) and
(CICHL,LL).
57Claim 3 We can ￿nd t∗∗ such that (BICHM), (BICML), (BIRL) and coalition incentive
constraints mentioned in Claim 2 are satis￿ed with equality at q = q∗ and ε = ε∗.
Once Claims 1-3 are proved, we conclude that {q∗,t∗∗} is optimal under no coalition - since
it satis￿es the conditions of Proposition 9 - and is also weakly collusion-proof.
P r o o fo fC l a i m1
If θv
M ≥ θv
L,t h e nt a k e†∗ =( 1 ,
pH+pM
pH ).50 If θv
M < θv











pH∆M > 0. In this way the virtual valuations for the third party in the side-
contract are equal to the virtual valuations for the seller when there is no coalition.
P r o o fo fC l a i m2
The following lemma establishes single crossing properties (when † = †∗) which are useful
to prove claim 2.
Lemma 2 (i) V †∗
jk is strictly concave, j,k = L,M,H.
(ii) For any x>0,i fθv
M ≥ θv

































































Proof. (i) The result is obvious for V †∗
HH, V †∗
MM and V †∗




L,M,H.A b o u t V †∗

























k (x;jk)] > 0.


























2, we obtain (32). The proofs of (33) and (34) are very similar
to the proof of (32), hence they are omitted.
In order to prove claim 2, we consider transfers such that the inequalities in the claim bind




50In fact, †HM ∈ [0,1). However, since we are interested in ￿nding the Sup of the seller￿s payoﬀ,w et a k e
†HM =1 .
58expositional simplicity, we introduce the following notation:
∆V †∗
HH ≡ V †∗
HH(2q∗




HM ≡ V †∗
HM(q∗
H + q∗





HL ≡ V †∗
HL(q∗
H + q∗
L) − V †∗
HL(2q∗
M) ∆V †∗
MM ≡ V †∗
MM(2q∗





ML ≡ V †∗
ML(q∗
M + q∗
L) − V †∗
ML(2q∗
L)
We ￿rst prove that all downward coalition incentive constraints are satis￿e da n dt h e nw e
deal with upward coalition incentive constraints.
Downward coalition incentive constraints
We start with downward coalition incentive constraints for HH coalition
CICHH The payoﬀ of HH coalition is V †∗
HH(q∗
H + q∗




M) − tHM − tMH ≥ V †∗
HH(q∗
H + q∗
L) − tHL − tLH
but −tHM − tMH = −∆V †∗




M) − V †∗
HH(q∗
H + q∗
L) ≥ V †∗
HM(q∗
H + q∗










M) − tHM − tMH ≥ V †∗
HH(2q∗
M) − 2tMM
but −tHM − tMH = −∆V †∗
HM − ∆V †∗




M) − V †∗
HH(2q∗
M) ≥ V †∗
HM(q∗
H + q∗






L) − V †∗
HL(2q∗
M)









M) − tHM − tMH ≥ V †∗
HH(q∗
M + q∗
L) − tML− tLM
but −tHM −tMH = −∆V †∗
HM −∆V †∗
HL−∆V †∗



































M) − tHM − tMH ≥ V †∗
HH(2q∗
L) − 2tLL
































M) − V †∗
ML(2q∗
L)





M, (32) and (33).
CICHM The payoﬀ of HM coalition is V †∗
HM(q∗
H + q∗




L) − tHL − tLH ≥ V †∗
HM(2q∗
M) − 2tMM
but −tHL − tLH = −∆V †∗




L) − V †∗
HM(2q∗
M) ≥ V †∗
HL(q∗
H + q∗






L) − tHL − tLH ≥ V †∗
HM(q∗
M + q∗
L) − tML− tLM
but −tHL − tLH = −∆V †∗
HL − ∆V †∗




L) − V †∗
HM(q∗
M + q∗
L)+α ≥ V †∗
HL(q∗
H + q∗











L) − tHL − tLH ≥ V †∗
HM(2q∗
L) − 2tLL
but −tHL − tLH = −∆V †∗
HL − ∆V †∗
MM − ∆V †∗




L) − V †∗
HM(2q∗
L)+α ≥ V †∗
HL(q∗
H + q∗











M) − V †∗
ML(2q∗
L).





M) − 2tMM ≥ V †∗
HL(q∗
M + q∗
L) − tML− tLM
60but −2tMM = −∆V †∗
MM − tML− tLM + α,h e n c e( C I C HL,ML) reduces to
V †∗
HL(2q∗
M) − V †∗
HL(q∗
M + q∗
L)+α ≥ V †∗
MM(2q∗










and then we can use (33) and q∗
M ≥ q∗
L. Observe that (35) is the reason why α is introduced
in (CICmodi￿ed
MM ML): If α =0 , then we do not know whether (35) is satis￿ed or not. A similar
argument applies to (36) below.
(CICHL,LL) V †∗
HL(2q∗
M) − 2tMM ≥ V †∗
HL(2q∗
L) − 2tLL
but −2tMM = −∆V †∗
MM − ∆V †∗
ML− 2tLL + α, hence (CICHL,LL)r e d u c e st o
V †∗
HL(2q∗
M) − V †∗
HL(2q∗
L)+α ≥ V †∗
MM(2q∗










This inequality holds because the right hand side minus α reduces to V †∗
ML(2q∗
M) − V †∗
ML(2q∗
L).
CICMM The payoﬀ of MM coalition is V †∗
MM(q∗
M + q∗




L) − tML− tLM + α ≥ V †∗
MM(2q∗
L) − 2tLL
but −tML− tLM = −∆V †∗
ML− 2tLL, hence (CICMM,LL)r e d u c e st o
V †∗
MM(2q∗
M) − V †∗
MM(2q∗
L) ≥ V †∗
ML(2q∗




CICHM The payoﬀ of HM coalition is V †∗
HM(q∗
H + q∗




M) − tHM − tMH ≥ V †∗
HM(2q∗
H) − 2tHH
but −2tHH = −∆V †∗
HH − tHM − tMH, hence (CICHM,HH) reduces to
V †∗
HH(2q∗
H) − V †∗
HH(q∗
H + q∗
M) ≥ V †∗
HM(2q∗




61CICHL The payoﬀ of HL coalition is V †∗
HL(q∗
H + q∗




L) − tHL − tLH ≥ V †∗
HL(q∗
H + q∗
M) − tHM − tMH
but −tHM − tMH = −∆V †∗




M) − V †∗
HM(q∗
H + q∗
L) ≥ V †∗
HL(q∗
H + q∗







L) − tHL − tLH ≥ V †∗
HL(2q∗
H) − 2tHH
but −2tHH = −∆V †∗
HH − ∆V †∗
HM − tHL − tLH, hence (CICHL,HH) reduces to
V †∗
HH(2q∗






M) − V †∗
HM(q∗
H + q∗
L) ≥ V †∗
HL(2q∗









M) − 2tMM ≥ V †∗
MM(q∗
H + q∗
L) − tHL − tLH
but −tHL − tLH = −∆V †∗




L) − V †∗
HL(2q∗
M) ≥ V †∗
MM(q∗
H + q∗
L) − V †∗
MM(2q∗
M). (37)
In order to prove that (37) is satis￿ed, recall that q∗
H +q∗
L ≥ 2q∗
M and observe that lemma 2(ii)
is not helpful if θv
M > θv

































∂x are strictly decreasing (because V †∗
HL and V †∗
MM










these inequalities in [2q∗
M,q∗
H + q∗
L] we conclude that (37) is satis￿ed.
(CICMM,HM) V †∗
MM(2q∗
M) − 2tMM ≥ V †∗
MM(q∗
H + q∗
M) − tHM − tMH
but −tHM − tMH = −∆V †∗
HM − ∆V †∗










L) − V †∗
HL(2q∗
M) ≥ V †∗
MM(q∗
H + q∗
M) − V †∗
MM(2q∗
M).





M, (32) and (37).
(CICMM,HH) V †∗
MM(2q∗
M) − 2tMM ≥ V †∗
MM(2q∗
H) − 2tHH
but −2tHH = −∆V †∗
HH − ∆V †∗
HM − ∆V †∗
HL − 2tMM, hence (CICMM,HH) reduces to
V †∗
HH(2q∗













L) − V †∗
HL(2q∗
M) ≥ V †∗
MM(2q∗
H) − V †∗
MM(2q∗
M).







62CICML The payoﬀ of ML coalition is V †∗
ML(q∗
M + q∗




L) − tML− tLM ≥ V †∗
ML(2q∗
M) − 2tMM
but −2tMM = −∆V †∗
MM − tML− tLM + α,h e n c e( C I C ML,MM) reduces to
V †∗
MM(2q∗
M) − V †∗
MM(q∗
M + q∗
L) ≥ V †∗
ML(2q∗








L) − tML− tLM ≥ V †∗
ML(q∗
H + q∗
L) − tHL − tLH
but −tHL − tLH = −∆V †∗
HL − ∆V †∗








M) − V †∗
MM(q∗
M + q∗
L) ≥ V †∗
ML(q∗
H + q∗








L) − V †∗
HL(2q∗
M) ≥ V †∗
ML(q∗
H + q∗






L) − tML − tLM ≥ V †∗
ML(q∗
H + q∗
M) − tHM − tMH
but −tHM −tMH = −∆V †∗
HM −∆V †∗
HL−∆V †∗




































L) − V †∗
HL(2q∗
M) ≥ V †∗
ML(q∗
H + q∗






L) − tML− tLM ≥ V †∗
ML(2q∗
H) − 2tHH























































H) − V †∗
ML(2q∗
M).





L) − 2tLL ≥ V †∗
LL(q∗
M + q∗
L) − tML− tLM
but −tML− tLM = −∆V †∗




L) − V †∗
ML(2q∗
L) ≥ V †∗
LL(q∗
M + q∗





L) − 2tLL ≥ V †∗
LL(2q∗
M) − 2tMM
but −2tMM = −∆V †∗
MM − ∆V †∗
ML− 2tLL + α, hence (CICLL,MM) reduces to
V †∗
MM(2q∗






L) − V †∗
ML(2q∗
L) ≥ V †∗
LL(2q∗






M) − V †∗
ML(2q∗
L) ≥ V †∗
LL(2q∗





L) − 2tLL ≥ V †∗
LL(q∗
H + q∗
L) − tHL − tLH
but −tHL − tLH = −∆V †∗
HL − ∆V †∗
MM − ∆V †∗































M) − V †∗
ML(2q∗
L) ≥ V †∗
LL(q∗
H + q∗





L) − 2tLL ≥ V †∗
LL(q∗
H + q∗
M) − tHM − tMH




























































L) − 2tLL ≥ V †∗
LL(2q∗
H) − 2tHH
but −2tHH = −∆V †∗
HH − ∆V †∗
HM − ∆V †∗
HL − ∆V †∗
MM − ∆V †∗























































M) − V †∗
ML(2q∗
L) ≥ V †∗
LL(2q∗
H) − V †∗
LL(2q∗
L).
P r o o fo fC l a i m3
Consider the linear system in t made of (CICHH,HM), (CICHM,HL), (CICHL,MM), (CICmodi￿ed
MM,ML),
(CICML,LL), (BICHM), (BICML) and (BIRL) written with equality with q = q∗.W es h o w
that this system admits at least one solution in t. In order to prove this claim, it is not suﬃcient
to observe that the system has eight equations and nine variables. However, we report below
the 8 ￿ 9 matrix A of the unknowns and we can show that ￿ for any probability distribution
(pL,p M,p H) ￿ its rank is 8. This claim is proved by ￿nding an 8 ￿ 8 submatrix of A with
nonvanishing determinant. For instance, we can take A after deleting its second column, the
one corresponding to tHM and obtain an 8 ￿ 8 matrix with determinant equal to −4pL.
equation\variable tHH tHM tHL tMH tMM tML tLH tLM tLL
(CICHH,MM) −21 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
(CICHM,HL)0 −11−10 0 1 0 0
(CICHL,MM)00 −10 2 0−10 0
(CICmodi￿ed
MM,ML)0000 −21 0 1 0
(CICML,LL)0 0 0 0 0 −10−12
(BICHM) −pH −pM −pL pH pM pL 000
(BICML)0 0 0 −pH −pM −pL pH pM pL
(BIRL)0 0 0 0 0 0 −pH −pM −pL
65Since the rank of A is 8, the range (or image) of the function f(t)=At is R8; hence for any
b ∈ R8 the linear system At = b admits a solution (actually, in￿nitely many solutions exist).
In particular, there exists a solution for our speci￿c linear system.
















L)] > 0.I f
t∗∗ is such that the following local downward coalition incentive constraints bind, then all the
coalition incentive constraints are satis￿ed by mechanism {q∗,t∗∗} when † = †∗.
V †∗
HH(2q∗
H) − 2tHH ≥ V †∗
HH(q∗
H + q∗




M) − tHM − tMH ≥ V †∗
HM(2q∗
M) − 2tMM (CICHM,MM)
V †∗
MM(2q∗
M) − 2tMM ≥ V †∗
MM(q∗
H + q∗




L) − tHL − tLH ≥ V †∗
HL(q∗
M + q∗





L) − tML− tLM ≥ V †∗
ML(2q∗
L) − 2tLL (CICML,LL)
The proof is very similar to the previous one and therefore it is omitted.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 2
Step 1 No reallocation occurs if ε =1 , conditional on no manipulation of reports.
Proof. In this setting, qε
H(x) is not de￿n e da si n( 5 )b u ta sf o l l o w s :qε
H(x) ≡ argmaxz∈[0,x] U(z,θH)+
U(x−z,θL)−
1−pL
pL ε[U(x−z,θH)−U(x−z,θL)].W h e nε =1and x = q∗
HL+q∗
LH, this function
is maximized at z = q∗




pL [U(qLH,θH) − U(qLH,θL)] under the constraint qHL + qLH = q∗
HL + q∗
LH;h e n c e ,n or e a l -
location occurs when ε =1if there is no manipulation of reports.
In order to deal with the coalition incentive constraints we de￿ne V2(x) ≡ 2U(x
2,θH),
V ε
1 (x) ≡ maxz∈[0,x] U(z,θH)+U(x − z,θL) −
1−pL














































L(x) because the function U(z,θH)+U(x − z,θL) −
1−pL
pL ε[U(x − z,θH) − U(x − z,θL)]
is strictly increasing in z for z ∈ [0, x












LH because (i) from the ￿rst order conditions for q∗
HL and q∗
LH it is straightfor-
ward to see that q∗
HL >q ∗















LH. From the ￿rst order conditions for q∗
HH and q∗
LL it is
straightforward to see that q∗
HH >q ∗
LL.
Step 3 Suppose q∗
HL+q∗
LH ≥ 2q∗
LL and let t∗∗ be such that (BIRL), (BICH), (CICHH,HL)
and (CICHL,LL) bind when q = q∗ and ε =1 .T h e n{q∗,t∗∗} satis￿es all the coalition incentive
constraints.




LH) ≥ V 1
1 (2q∗
HH) − V 1
1 (q∗
HL + q∗












LH) − V 1
1 (2q∗
LL) ≥ V 1
0 (q∗
HL + q∗
LH) − V 1
0 (2q∗
LL) (38)
we now prove that this inequality holds. Examining the seller￿s pro￿t function after using






























LL) and V 1
0 (2q∗
LL) − C(2q∗





LH); thus, (38) is satis￿ed.
(CICHH,LL) reduces to V2(q∗
HL+q∗
LH)− V2(2q∗





















LH) − V 1
1 (2q∗
LL) ≥ V 1
0 (2q∗
HH) − V 1
0 (2q∗











Step 4 Suppose q∗
HL+q∗
LH < 2q∗
LL and let t∗∗∗ be such that (BIRL), (BICH), (CICHH,LL)
and (CICLL,HL) bind when q = q∗ and ε =1 .T h e n {q∗,t∗∗∗} satis￿es all the coalition
incentive constraints.
Proof. Given that (CICHH,LL) and (CICLL,HL) bind, (CICLL,HH) reduces to V2(2q∗
HH) −
V2(2q∗
LL) ≥ V 1
0 (2q∗
HH) − V 1
0 (2q∗















LL. (CICHH,HL) reduces to V2(2q∗
LL)−V2(q∗
HL+q∗



























LH),w h i c hi s








P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 3



















































L)] and notice that g(0) = 0
while (40) is equivalent to g(q∗
H − q∗





L) > 0.W e￿nd
g0(z)=θHu0[q1
H(2q∗






Thus, g0(z) > 0 if and only if q1
H(2q∗




2 . In order to establish the latter








































the assumption that u00































L+z), the inequality which implies g0(z) > 0 for z ∈ (0,q∗
H−q∗
L).
(a)-1. The proof of ￿reporting L is strictly dominant for each L-type￿.
It is useful to write down the payoﬀ matrices in M∗∗ for L-type and H-type, respectively. For
example, θLu(q∗
H)−t∗∗
HL, the entry in the left table below corresponding to row H and column


































We ￿rst show that (42) holds and then prove (41). In view of the expressions for t∗∗,( 4 2 )
is equivalent to
[θL − (1 + pL)θH]u(q∗






) − pLV 1
1 (2q∗
L)
The de￿nition of V 1
1 and the strict concavity of u imply that V 1
1 (2q∗




















θH.H e n c e ,i ti ss u ﬃcient to prove that
[2θL − (2 − pL)θH]u(q∗
















If (2−pL)θH −2θL ≥ 0, then we are done. If instead (2−pL)θH −2θL < 0, then we use again










L).W eo b t a i n







L) > 0, which is easy to verify.





to the left and the right hand side of (42), respectively. Since the latter holds, (39) implies
that (41) is satis￿ed as well.
(a)-2. The proof of ￿each H-type strictly prefers to report H (L) if his opponent plays H
(L)￿.
By observing the right payoﬀ matrix above we ￿nd that ￿each H-type strictly prefers to


































HH,b u y e r1, for instance (regardless of his type), has a
chance to be better oﬀ with respect to the truthtelling equilibrium only if his opponent plays
69H more often than under truthtelling. However, this cannot occur in any equilibrium of M∗∗
￿ regardless of buyer 2￿s beliefs about θ1 - since reporting L is strictly dominant for L-typeof
buyer 2. Hence, in any equilibrium of M∗∗ the probability that 2 reports H is at most equal
to the probability that 2 reports H under truthtelling.
(c) Each L-type reports L in any equilibrium of M∗∗. Consider the payoﬀ bimatrix (in
Section 7) of the game played by 1H and 2H (actually, tjk should be replaced by t∗∗
jk, for any
jk). That game has two equilibria, since report Lweakly dominates H both for 1H and for
2H. In one of them, both 1H and 2H play H; in the other one, both 1H and 2H play L.I n
the latter equilibrium, the payoﬀ of j−type is θju(q∗
L) − t∗∗
LL, j = L,H.F r o m( 1 5 )w ek n o w
that θLu(q∗
L) − t∗∗











LH. Thus, the untruthful equilibrium is strictly
Pareto dominated by truthtelling.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 4
(a) MR is optimal under no coalition formation since qR = q∗ and (BICH) and (BIRL)
bind. In order to show that MR is weakly collusion-proof, notice that no reallocation occurs
if † =1since qR = q∗, hence we need to prove that all coalition incentive constraints are
satis￿ed by MR when † =1 .
First observe that we need to take care only of local (upward and downward) coalition
incentive constraints. Indeed, both (CICHH,LL) and (CICLL,HH) are automatically satis￿ed
if all the other coalition incentive constraints hold, thanks to the single crossing condition.
To prove this claim, suppose that (CICHH,HL), (CICHL,HH), (CICHL,LL) and (CICLL,HL)
are all satis￿ed. Then, add up (CICHH,HL) and (CICHL,LL) to ￿nd V2(2q∗

















by single crossing, we obtain V2(2q∗
H)−2tHH >V 2(2q∗
L)−2tLL.T h u s ,(CICHH,LL) is satis￿ed.
About (CICLL,HH), add up (CICLL,HL) and (CICHL,HH) to obtain V 1
0 (2q∗











H)−2tHH by single crossing; hence (CICLL,HH)
is satis￿e d . T h e r e f o r e ,w et a k ec a r eo n l yo f(CICHH,HL), (CICHL,HH), (CICHL,LL) and
(CICLL,HL).
From (BIRL), (BICH) and (20) written with equality we obtain
tLL = θH[u(q∗
L) − u(q∗









L)] − pLα − pLtHL
1 − pL
We substitute these expressions into the local coalition incentive constraints ￿ after letting
K ≡ (2 − pL)θHu(q∗
H)+[ θL − (2 − pL)θH]u(q∗
L) ￿t o￿nd that (CICHH,HL) and (CICHL,HH)
70are equivalent to




≤ tHL ≤ K + pLα − (1 − pL)[V 1
1 (2q∗





while (CICHL,LL) and (CICLL,HL) are equivalent to
K − (2 − pL)α − (1 − pL)[V 1
1 (q∗
H + q∗
L) − V 1
1 (2q∗
L)]
≤ tHL ≤ K − (2 − pL)α − (1 − pL)[V 1
0 (q∗
H + q∗










L) − V 1
1 (2q∗
L),t h e nw es e ttHL so that (CICHH,HL)
binds. We want to prove that the other local coalition incentive constraints hold if α > 0 is
small. For this purpose, ￿rst we show that they are strictly satis￿ed when α =0and then
argue by continuity. (CICHL,HH) is strictly satis￿ed because of single crossing [see (44)],
while (CICHL,LL) is equivalent to V2(2q∗
H) − V2(q∗
H + q∗
L) ≤ V 1
1 (q∗
H + q∗
L) − V 1
1 (2q∗
L) ￿w h i c h
strictly holds by hypothesis ￿ and (CICLL,HL) reduces to V2(2q∗
H) − V2(q∗
H + q∗




L) − V 1
0 (2q∗
L)] ≥ 0. In order to establish that the latter inequality holds strictly, de￿ne
g(z) ≡ V2(q∗
H + q∗
L + z) − V2(q∗
H + q∗
L) − [V 1
0 (2q∗
L + z) − V 1
0 (2q∗
L)];w ew a n tt op r o v et h a t
g(q∗
H −q∗















2) for any z ∈ [0,q∗
H − q∗
L). Here transfers are found by









































L) − (1 − pL)θHu(q∗









L) ≥ V 1
1 (q∗
H + q∗
L) − V 1
1 (2q∗
L),t h e nw es e t
tR
HL = K − (2 − pL)α − (1 − pL)[V 1
1 (q∗
H + q∗
L) − V 1
1 (2q∗
L)] + β
with β > 0 and small so that (CICHL,LL) is slightly slack. We now show that the other
local coalition incentive constraints are strictly satis￿ed when α =0 , hence they are still
so if α > 0 is small. (CICLL,HL) is strictly satis￿ed because of single crossing [see (45)],











71which holds strictly by assumption ￿ and (CICHL HH) reduces to V 1
1 (q∗
H + q∗










1−pL ≥ 0. The latter inequality holds strictly because of the following











that g(0) = 0.M o r e o v e r , g0(z)=θHu0[q1
H(2q∗
L + z)] − θHu0[q1
H(q∗
H + q∗
L + z)] > 0 because
q1
H(2q∗
L +z) <q 1
H(q∗
H +q∗
L +z) for any z ∈ [0,q∗
H −q∗




1−pL since β > 0
is small. In this case transfers are found by solving the linear system made up of (BIRL),
(BICH), (CIC
β
HL,LL) and (20), all written with equality:
tR
HL =( 2 − pL)θHu(q∗
H)+[ θL − (2 − pL)θH]u(q∗
L) − (1 − pL)[V 1
1 (q∗
H + q∗
L) − V 1
1 (2q∗
L)]
−(2 − pL)α + β
tR
LL =( 1 − pL)θHu(q∗
H)+[ θL − (1 − pL)θH]u(q∗
L) − (1 − pL)[V 1
1 (q∗
H + q∗
L) − V 1
1 (2q∗
L)]



































HH by (15), we can apply exactly the same arguments of
the proof of Proposition 13(b).
(c) Consider tR with α =0 . Then, by (20) and since (BICH) binds, each H-type is
indiﬀerent between reporting H or L, regardless of the report of the opponent. If α > 0 is
small, then from (20) we infer that H-type strictly prefers reporting H if his opponent plays
L;s i n c e(BICH) binds, he strictly prefers reporting L when his opponent plays H.A b o u t









HH. Furthermore, he strictly prefers





when α =0or α > 0 is small.
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